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Executive Order 14086 signed on October 7, 2022 by President Joe Biden has some interesting language that could affect the past, present and future of signals intelligence operations of the United States government. Executive Order 14086 follows:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the

laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. The United States collects signals intelligence so that

its national security decision makers have access to the timely, accurate,

and insightful information necessary to advance the national security interests

of the United States and to protect its citizens and the citizens of its

allies and partners from harm. Signals intelligence capabilities are a major

reason we have been able to adapt to a dynamic and challenging security

environment, and the United States must preserve and continue to develop

robust and technologically advanced signals intelligence capabilities to protect

our security and that of our allies and partners. At the same time,

the United States recognizes that signals intelligence activities must take

into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect,

regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all

persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal

information. Therefore, this order establishes safeguards for such signals

intelligence activities.

Sec. 2. Signals Intelligence Activities.

(a) Principles. Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized and conducted

consistent with the following principles:

(i) Signals intelligence activities shall be authorized by statute or by Executive

Order, proclamation, or other Presidential directive and undertaken

in accordance with the Constitution and with applicable statutes and

Executive Orders, proclamations, and other Presidential directives.

(ii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subject to appropriate safeguards,

which shall ensure that privacy and civil liberties are integral considerations

in the planning and implementation of such activities so that:

(A) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only following a

determination, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors,

that the activities are necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority,

although signals intelligence does not have to be the sole means available

or used for advancing aspects of the validated intelligence priority; and

(B) signals intelligence activities shall be conducted only to the extent

and in a manner that is proportionate to the validated intelligence priority

for which they have been authorized, with the aim of achieving a proper

balance between the importance of the validated intelligence priority being

advanced and the impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all persons,

regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.

(iii) Signals intelligence activities shall be subjected to rigorous oversight

in order to ensure that they comport with the principles identified above.

(b) Objectives. Signals intelligence collection activities shall be conducted

in pursuit of legitimate objectives.

(i) Legitimate objectives.

(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be conducted only

in pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:
(1) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities

of a foreign government, a foreign military, a faction of a foreign nation,

a foreign-based political organization, or an entity acting on behalf

of or controlled by any such foreign government, military, faction,

or political organization, in order to protect the national security

of the United States and of its allies and partners;

(2) understanding or assessing the capabilities, intentions, or activities

of foreign organizations, including international terrorist organizations,

that pose a current or potential threat to the national security of the

United States or of its allies or partners;

(3) understanding or assessing transnational threats that impact global

security, including climate and other ecological change, public health

risks, humanitarian threats, political instability, and geographic rivalry;

(4) protecting against foreign military capabilities and activities;

(5) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding

of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and

rescue of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(6) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other intelligence

activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance

of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(7) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies

and threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a

foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(8) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or

malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign government,

foreign organization, or foreign person;

(9) protecting against threats to the personnel of the United States or

of its allies or partners;

(10) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit

finance and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other objectives

identified in subsection (b)(i) of this section;

(11) protecting the integrity of elections and political processes, government

property, and United States infrastructure (both physical and

electronic) from activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance

of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

and

(12) advancing collection or operational capabilities or activities in

order to further a legitimate objective identified in subsection (b)(i)

of this section.

(B) The President may authorize updates to the list of objectives in

light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened

threats to the national security of the United States, for which the President

determines that signals intelligence collection activities may be used. The

Director of National Intelligence (Director) shall publicly release any updates

to the list of objectives authorized by the President, unless the

President determines that doing so would pose a risk to the national

security of the United States.

(ii) Prohibited objectives.

(A) Signals intelligence collection activities shall not be conducted for

the purpose of:

(1) suppressing or burdening criticism, dissent, or the free expression

of ideas or political opinions by individuals or the press;

(2) suppressing or restricting legitimate privacy interests;

(3) suppressing or restricting a right to legal counsel; or

(4) disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, gender

identity, sexual orientation, or religion.

(B) It is not a legitimate objective to collect foreign private commercial

information or trade secrets to afford a competitive advantage to United

States companies and United States business sectors commercially. The
collection of such information is authorized only to protect the national

security of the United States or of its allies or partners.

(iii) Validation of signals intelligence collection priorities.

(A) Under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended

(50 U.S.C. 3024), the Director must establish priorities for the Intelligence

Community to ensure the timely and effective collection of national intelligence,

including national intelligence collected through signals intelligence.

The Director does this through the National Intelligence Priorities

Framework (NIPF), which the Director maintains and presents to the President,

through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,

on a regular basis. In order to ensure that signals intelligence collection

activities are undertaken to advance legitimate objectives, before presenting

the NIPF or any successor framework that identifies intelligence priorities

to the President, the Director shall obtain from the Civil Liberties Protection

Officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (CLPO) an

assessment as to whether, with regard to anticipated signals intelligence

collection activities, each of the intelligence priorities identified in the

NIPF or successor framework:

(1) advances one or more of the legitimate objectives set forth in subsection

(b)(i) of this section;

(2) neither was designed nor is anticipated to result in signals intelligence

collection in contravention of the prohibited objectives set

forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and

(3) was established after appropriate consideration for the privacy and

civil liberties of all persons, regardless of their nationality or wherever

they might reside.

(B) If the Director disagrees with any aspect of the CLPO’s assessment

with respect to any of the intelligence priorities identified in the NIPF

or successor framework, the Director shall include the CLPO’s assessment

and the Director’s views when presenting the NIPF to the President.

(c) Privacy and civil liberties safeguards. The following safeguards shall

fulfill the principles contained in subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) of this section.

(i) Collection of signals intelligence.

(A) The United States shall conduct signals intelligence collection activities

only following a determination that a specific signals intelligence

collection activity, based on a reasonable assessment of all relevant factors,

is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority, although signals

intelligence does not have to be the sole means available or used for

advancing aspects of the validated intelligence priority; it could be used,

for example, to ensure alternative pathways for validation or for maintaining

reliable access to the same information. In determining whether to

collect signals intelligence consistent with this principle, the United

States—through an element of the Intelligence Community or through

an interagency committee consisting in whole or in part of the heads

of elements of the Intelligence Community, the heads of departments

containing such elements, or their designees—shall consider the availability,

feasibility, and appropriateness of other less intrusive sources and

methods for collecting the information necessary to advance a validated

intelligence priority, including from diplomatic and public sources, and

shall prioritize such available, feasible, and appropriate alternatives to

signals intelligence.

(B) Signals intelligence collection activities shall be as tailored as feasible

to advance a validated intelligence priority and, taking due account of

relevant factors, not disproportionately impact privacy and civil liberties.

Such factors may include, depending on the circumstances, the nature

of the pursued objective; the feasible steps taken to limit the scope of

the collection to the authorized purpose; the intrusiveness of the collection

activity, including its duration; the probable contribution of the collection

to the objective pursued; the reasonably foreseeable consequences to individuals,

including unintended third parties; the nature and sensitivity
of the data to be collected; and the safeguards afforded to the information

collected.

(C) For purposes of subsection (c)(i) of this section, the scope of a

specific signals intelligence collection activity may include, for example,

a specific line of effort or target, as appropriate.

(ii) Bulk collection of signals intelligence.

(A) Targeted collection shall be prioritized. The bulk collection of signals

intelligence shall be authorized only based on a determination—by an

element of the Intelligence Community or through an interagency committee

consisting in whole or in part of the heads of elements of the

Intelligence Community, the heads of departments containing such elements,

or their designees—that the information necessary to advance a

validated intelligence priority cannot reasonably be obtained by targeted

collection. When it is determined to be necessary to engage in bulk collection

in order to advance a validated intelligence priority, the element

of the Intelligence Community shall apply reasonable methods and technical

measures in order to limit the data collected to only what is necessary

to advance a validated intelligence priority, while minimizing the collection

of non-pertinent information.

(B) Each element of the Intelligence Community that collects signals

intelligence through bulk collection shall use such information only in

pursuit of one or more of the following objectives:

(1) protecting against terrorism, the taking of hostages, and the holding

of individuals captive (including the identification, location, and

rescue of hostages and captives) conducted by or on behalf of a foreign

government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(2) protecting against espionage, sabotage, assassination, or other intelligence

activities conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance

of a foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(3) protecting against threats from the development, possession, or

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies

and threats conducted by, on behalf of, or with the assistance of a

foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign person;

(4) protecting against cybersecurity threats created or exploited by, or

malicious cyber activities conducted by or on behalf of, a foreign government,

foreign organization, or foreign person;

(5) protecting against threats to the personnel of the United States or

of its allies or partners; and

(6) protecting against transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance

and sanctions evasion related to one or more of the other objectives

identified in subsection (c)(ii) of this section.

(C) The President may authorize updates to the list of objectives in

light of new national security imperatives, such as new or heightened

threats to the national security of the United States, for which the President

determines that bulk collection may be used. The Director shall publicly

release any updates to the list of objectives authorized by the President,

unless the President determines that doing so would pose a risk to the

national security of the United States.

(D) In order to minimize any impact on privacy and civil liberties,

a targeted signals intelligence collection activity that temporarily uses

data acquired without discriminants (for example, without specific identifiers

or selection terms) shall be subject to the safeguards described in

this subsection, unless such data is:

(1) used only to support the initial technical phase of the targeted

signals intelligence collection activity;

(2) retained for only the short period of time required to complete

this phase; and

(3) thereafter deleted.

(iii) Handling of personal information collected through signals intelligence.
(A) Minimization. Each element of the Intelligence Community that

handles personal information collected through signals intelligence shall

establish and apply policies and procedures designed to minimize the

dissemination and retention of personal information collected through

signals intelligence.

(1) Dissemination. Each element of the Intelligence Community that

handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:

(a) shall disseminate non-United States persons’ personal information

collected through signals intelligence only if it involves one or more of

the comparable types of information that section 2.3 of Executive Order

12333 of December 4, 1981 (United States Intelligence Activities), as

amended, states may be disseminated in the case of information concerning

United States persons;

(b) shall not disseminate personal information collected through signals

intelligence solely because of a person’s nationality or country of

residence;

(c) shall disseminate within the United States Government personal

information collected through signals intelligence only if an authorized

and appropriately trained individual has a reasonable belief that the personal

information will be appropriately protected and that the recipient

has a need to know the information;

(d) shall take due account of the purpose of the dissemination, the nature

and extent of the personal information being disseminated, and the

potential for harmful impact on the person or persons concerned before

disseminating personal information collected through signals intelligence

to recipients outside the United States Government, including to

a foreign government or international organization; and

(e) shall not disseminate personal information collected through signals

intelligence for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this

order.

(2) Retention. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles

personal information collected through signals intelligence:

(a) shall retain non-United States persons’ personal information collected

through signals intelligence only if the retention of comparable

information concerning United States persons would be permitted under

applicable law and shall subject such information to the same retention

periods that would apply to comparable information concerning United

States persons;

(b) shall subject non-United States persons’ personal information collected

through signals intelligence for which no final retention determination

has been made to the same temporary retention periods that

would apply to comparable information concerning United States persons;

and

(c) shall delete non-United States persons’ personal information collected

through signals intelligence that may no longer be retained in the

same manner that comparable information concerning United States persons

would be deleted.

(B) Data security and access. Each element of the Intelligence Community

that handles personal information collected through signals intelligence:

(1) shall process and store personal information collected through signals

intelligence under conditions that provide appropriate protection

and prevent access by unauthorized persons, consistent with the applicable

safeguards for sensitive information contained in relevant Executive

Orders, proclamations, other Presidential directives, Intelligence

Community directives, and associated policies;

(2) shall limit access to such personal information to authorized personnel

who have a need to know the information to perform their

mission and have received appropriate training on the requirements

of applicable United States law, as described in policies and procedures

issued under subsection (c)(iv) of this section; and
(3) shall ensure that personal information collected through signals intelligence

for which no final retention determination has been made

is accessed only in order to make or support such a determination

or to conduct authorized administrative, testing, development, security,

or oversight functions.

(C) Data quality. Each element of the Intelligence Community that handles

personal information collected through signals intelligence shall include

such personal information in intelligence products only as consistent

with applicable Intelligence Community standards for accuracy and objectivity,

with a focus on applying standards relating to the quality and

reliability of the information, consideration of alternative sources of information

and interpretations of data, and objectivity in performing analysis.

(D) Queries of bulk collection. Each element of the Intelligence Community

that conducts queries of unminimized signals intelligence obtained

by bulk collection shall do so consistent with the permissible uses of

signals intelligence obtained by bulk collection identified in subsection

(c)(ii)(B) of this section and according to policies and procedures issued

under subsection (c)(iv) of this section, which shall appropriately take

into account the impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all persons,

regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside.

(E) Documentation. In order to facilitate the oversight processes set

forth in subsection (d) of this section and the redress mechanism set

forth in section 3 of this order, each element of the Intelligence Community

that engages in signals intelligence collection activities shall maintain

documentation to the extent reasonable in light of the nature and type

of collection at issue and the context in which it is collected. The content

of any such documentation may vary based on the circumstances but

shall, to the extent reasonable, provide the factual basis pursuant to which

the element of the Intelligence Community, based on a reasonable assessment

of all relevant factors, assesses that the signals intelligence collection

activity is necessary to advance a validated intelligence priority.

(iv) Update and publication of policies and procedures. The head of

each element of the Intelligence Community:

(A) shall continue to use the policies and procedures issued pursuant

to Presidential Policy Directive 28 of January 17, 2014 (Signals Intelligence

Activities) (PPD–28), until they are updated pursuant to subsection

(c)(iv)(B) of this section;

(B) shall, within 1 year of the date of this order, in consultation with

the Attorney General, the CLPO, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight

Board (PCLOB), update those policies and procedures as necessary

to implement the privacy and civil liberties safeguards in this order;

and

(C) shall, within 1 year of the date of this order, release these policies

and procedures publicly to the maximum extent possible, consistent with

the protection of intelligence sources and methods, in order to enhance

the public’s understanding of, and to promote public trust in, the safeguards

pursuant to which the United States conducts signals intelligence activities.

(v) Review by the PCLOB.

(A) Nature of review. Consistent with applicable law, the PCLOB is

encouraged to conduct a review of the updated policies and procedures

described in subsection (c)(iv)(B) of this section once they have been

issued to ensure that they are consistent with the enhanced safeguards

contained in this order.

(B) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of completion of any

review by the PCLOB described in subsection (c)(v)(A) of this section,

the head of each element of the Intelligence Community shall carefully

consider and shall implement or otherwise address all recommendations

contained in such review, consistent with applicable law.
(d) Subjecting signals intelligence activities to rigorous oversight. The actions

directed in this subsection are designed to build on the oversight

mechanisms that elements of the Intelligence Community already have in

place, in order to further ensure that signals intelligence activities are subjected

to rigorous oversight.

(i) Legal, oversight, and compliance officials. Each element of the Intelligence

Community that collects signals intelligence:

(A) shall have in place senior-level legal, oversight, and compliance

officials who conduct periodic oversight of signals intelligence activities,

including an Inspector General, a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, and

an officer or officers in a designated compliance role with the authority

to conduct oversight of and ensure compliance with applicable United

States law;

(B) shall provide such legal, oversight, and compliance officials access

to all information pertinent to carrying out their oversight responsibilities

under this subsection, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources

or methods, including their oversight responsibilities to ensure that any

appropriate actions are taken to remediate an incident of non-compliance

with applicable United States law; and

(C) shall not take any actions designed to impede or improperly influence

such legal, oversight, and compliance officials in carrying out their oversight

responsibilities under this subsection.

(ii) Training. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall maintain

appropriate training requirements to ensure that all employees with access

to signals intelligence know and understand the requirements of this order

and the policies and procedures for reporting and remediating incidents

of non-compliance with applicable United States law.

(iii) Significant incidents of non-compliance.

(A) Each element of the Intelligence Community shall ensure that, if

a legal, oversight, or compliance official, as described in subsection (d)(i)

of this section, or any other employee, identifies a significant incident

of non-compliance with applicable United States law, the incident is

reported promptly to the head of the element of the Intelligence Community,

the head of the executive department or agency (agency) containing

the element of the Intelligence Community (to the extent relevant), and

the Director.

(B) Upon receipt of such report, the head of the element of the Intelligence

Community, the head of the agency containing the element of

the Intelligence Community (to the extent relevant), and the Director shall

ensure that any necessary actions are taken to remediate and prevent

the recurrence of the significant incident of non-compliance.

(e) Savings clause. Provided the signals intelligence collection is conducted

consistent with and in the manner prescribed by this section of this order,

this order does not limit any signals intelligence collection technique authorized

under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 3001

et seq.), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended

(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) (FISA), Executive Order 12333, or other applicable

law or Presidential directive.

Sec. 3. Signals Intelligence Redress Mechanism.

(a) Purpose. This section establishes a redress mechanism to review qualifying

complaints transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying

state concerning United States signals intelligence activities for any

covered violation of United States law and, if necessary, appropriate remediation.

(b) Process for submission of qualifying complaints. Within 60 days of

the date of this order, the Director, in consultation with the Attorney General

and the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community that collect or
handle personal information collected through signals intelligence, shall establish

a process for the submission of qualifying complaints transmitted

by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state.

(c) Initial investigation of qualifying complaints by the CLPO.

(i) Establishment. The Director, in consultation with the Attorney General,

shall establish a process that authorizes the CLPO to investigate, review,

and, as necessary, order appropriate remediation for qualifying complaints.

This process shall govern how the CLPO will review qualifying complaints

in a manner that protects classified or otherwise privileged or protected

information and shall ensure, at a minimum, that for each qualifying

complaint the CLPO shall:

(A) review information necessary to investigate the qualifying complaint;

(B) exercise its statutory and delegated authority to determine whether

there was a covered violation by:

(i) taking into account both relevant national security interests and

applicable privacy protections;

(ii) giving appropriate deference to any relevant determinations made

by national security officials; and

(iii) applying the law impartially;

(C) determine the appropriate remediation for any covered violation;

(D) provide a classified report on information indicating a violation

of any authority subject to the oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Court (FISC) to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security,

who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with its rules of

procedure;

(E) after the review is completed, inform the complainant, through the

appropriate public authority in a qualifying state and without confirming

or denying that the complainant was subject to United States signals

intelligence activities, that:

(1) ‘‘the review either did not identify any covered violations or the

Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence issued a determination requiring appropriate remediation’’;

(2) the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community may,

as prescribed in the regulations issued by the Attorney General pursuant

to section 3(d)(i) of this order, apply for review of the CLPO’s

determinations by the Data Protection Review Court described in subsection

(d) of this section; and

(3) if either the complainant or an element of the Intelligence Community

applies for review by the Data Protection Review Court, a special

advocate will be selected by the Data Protection Review Court to advocate

regarding the complainant’s interest in the matter;

(F) maintain appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying

complaint and produce a classified decision explaining the basis for its

factual findings, determination with respect to whether a covered violation

occurred, and determination of the appropriate remediation in the event

there was such a violation, consistent with its statutory and delegated

authority;

(G) prepare a classified ex parte record of review, which shall consist

of the appropriate documentation of its review of the qualifying complaint

and the classified decision described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of this section;

and

(H) provide any necessary support to the Data Protection Review Court.

(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each

agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply

with any determination by the CLPO to undertake appropriate remediation
pursuant to subsection (c)(i)(C) of this section, subject to any contrary

determination by the Data Protection Review Court.

(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide

the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the reviews

described in subsection (c)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection

of intelligence sources and methods, and shall not take any actions designed

to impede or improperly influence the CLPO’s reviews. Privacy

and civil liberties officials within elements of the Intelligence Community

shall also support the CLPO as it performs the reviews described in

subsection (c)(i) of this section.

(iv) Independence. The Director shall not interfere with a review by the

CLPO of a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section;

nor shall the Director remove the CLPO for any actions taken pursuant

to this order, except for instances of misconduct, malfeasance, breach

of security, neglect of duty, or incapacity.

(d) Data Protection Review Court.

(i) Establishment. The Attorney General is authorized to and shall establish

a process to review determinations made by the CLPO under subsection

(c)(i) of this section. In exercising that authority, the Attorney General

shall, within 60 days of the date of this order, promulgate regulations

establishing a Data Protection Review Court to exercise the Attorney General’s

authority to review such determinations. These regulations shall,

at a minimum, provide that:

(A) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce,

the Director, and the PCLOB, shall appoint individuals to serve

as judges on the Data Protection Review Court, who shall be legal practitioners

with appropriate experience in the fields of data privacy and

national security law, giving weight to individuals with prior judicial

experience, and who shall not be, at the time of their initial appointment,

employees of the United States Government. During their term of appointment

on the Data Protection Review Court, such judges shall not have

any official duties or employment within the United States Government

other than their official duties and employment as judges on the Data

Protection Review Court.

(B) Upon receipt of an application for review filed by the complainant

or an element of the Intelligence Community of a determination made

by the CLPO under subsection (c) of this section, a three-judge panel

of the Data Protection Review Court shall be convened to review the

application. Service on the Data Protection Review Court panel shall require

that the judge hold the requisite security clearances to access classified

national security information.

(C) Upon being convened, the Data Protection Review Court panel shall

select a special advocate through procedures prescribed in the Attorney

General’s regulations. The special advocate shall assist the panel in its

consideration of the application for review, including by advocating regarding

the complainant’s interest in the matter and ensuring that the Data

Protection Review Court panel is well informed of the issues and the

law with respect to the matter. Service as a special advocate shall require

that the special advocate hold the requisite security clearances to access

classified national security information and to adhere to restrictions prescribed

in the Attorney General’s regulations on communications with

the complainant to ensure the protection of classified or otherwise privileged

or protected information.

(D) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall impartially review

the determinations made by the CLPO with respect to whether a covered

violation occurred and the appropriate remediation in the event there

was such a violation. The review shall be based at a minimum on the

classified ex parte record of review described in subsection (c)(i)(F) of

this section and information or submissions provided by the complainant,
the special advocate, or an element of the Intelligence Community. In

reviewing determinations made by the CLPO, the Data Protection Review

Court panel shall be guided by relevant decisions of the United States

Supreme Court in the same way as are courts established under Article

III of the United States Constitution, including those decisions regarding

appropriate deference to relevant determinations of national security officials.

(E) In the event that the Data Protection Review Court panel disagrees

with any of the CLPO’s determinations with respect to whether a covered

violation occurred or the appropriate remediation in the event there was

such a violation, the panel shall issue its own determinations.

(F) The Data Protection Review Court panel shall provide a classified

report on information indicating a violation of any authority subject to

the oversight of the FISC to the Assistant Attorney General for National

Security, who shall report violations to the FISC in accordance with

its rules of procedure.

(G) After the review is completed, the CLPO shall be informed of the

Data Protection Review Court panel’s determinations through procedures

prescribed by the Attorney General’s regulations.

(H) After a review is completed in response to a complainant’s application

for review, the Data Protection Review Court, through procedures

prescribed by the Attorney General’s regulations, shall inform the complainant,

through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state

and without confirming or denying that the complainant was subject to

United States signals intelligence activities, that ‘‘the review either did

not identify any covered violations or the Data Protection Review Court

issued a determination requiring appropriate remediation.’’

(ii) Binding effect. Each element of the Intelligence Community, and each

agency containing an element of the Intelligence Community, shall comply

with any determination by a Data Protection Review Court panel to undertake

appropriate remediation.

(iii) Assistance. Each element of the Intelligence Community shall provide

the CLPO with access to information necessary to conduct the review

described in subsection (d)(i) of this section, consistent with the protection

of intelligence sources and methods, that a Data Protection Review Court

panel requests from the CLPO and shall not take any actions for the

purpose of impeding or improperly influencing a panel’s review.

(iv) Independence. The Attorney General shall not interfere with a review

by a Data Protection Review Court panel of a determination the CLPO

made regarding a qualifying complaint under subsection (c)(i) of this section;

nor shall the Attorney General remove any judges appointed as

provided in subsection (d)(i)(A) of this section, or remove any judge from

service on a Data Protection Review Court panel, except for instances

of misconduct, malfeasance, breach of security, neglect of duty, or incapacity,

after taking due account of the standards in the Rules for Judicial-

Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings promulgated by the Judicial

Conference of the United States pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and

Disability Act (28 U.S.C. 351 et seq.).

(v) Record of determinations. For each qualifying complaint transmitted

by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state, the Secretary

of Commerce shall:

(A) maintain a record of the complainant who submitted such complaint;

(B) not later than 5 years after the date of this order and no less

than every 5 years thereafter, contact the relevant element or elements

of the Intelligence Community regarding whether information pertaining

to the review of such complaint by the CLPO has been declassified and

whether information pertaining to the review of any application for review

submitted to the Data Protection Review Court has been declassified,
including whether an element of the Intelligence Community filed an

application for review with the Data Protection Review Court; and

(C) if informed that such information has been declassified, notify the

complainant, through the appropriate public authority in a qualifying state,

that information pertaining to the review of their complaint by the CLPO

or to the review of any application for review submitted to the Data

Protection Review Court may be available under applicable law.

(e) Annual review by PCLOB of redress process.

(i) Nature of review. Consistent with applicable law, the PCLOB is encouraged

to conduct an annual review of the processing of qualifying complaints

by the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this order,

including whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court processed

qualifying complaints in a timely manner; whether the CLPO and

the Data Protection Review Court are obtaining full access to necessary

information; whether the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court

are operating consistent with this order; whether the safeguards established

by section 2 of this order are properly considered in the processes of

the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court; and whether the elements

of the Intelligence Community have fully complied with determinations

made by the CLPO and the Data Protection Review Court.

(ii) Assistance. The Attorney General, the CLPO, and the elements of

the Intelligence Community shall provide the PCLOB with access to information

necessary to conduct the review described in subsection (e)(i)

of this section, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

methods.

(iii) Report and certification. Within 30 days of completing any review

described in subsection (e)(i) of this section, the PCLOB is encouraged

to:

(A) provide the President, the Attorney General, the Director, the heads

of elements of the Intelligence Community, the CLPO, and the congressional

intelligence committees with a classified report detailing the results

of its review;

(B) release to the public an unclassified version of the report; and

(C) make an annual public certification as to whether the redress mechanism

established pursuant to section 3 of this order is processing complaints

consistent with this order.

(iv) Consideration of review. Within 180 days of receipt of any report

by the PCLOB described in subsection (e)(iii)(A) of this section, the Attorney

General, the Director, the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community,

and the CLPO shall carefully consider and shall implement or otherwise

address all recommendations contained in such report, consistent

with applicable law.

(f) Designation of qualifying state.

(i) To implement the redress mechanism established by section 3 of this

order, the Attorney General is authorized to designate a country or regional

economic integration organization as a qualifying state for purposes of

the redress mechanism established pursuant to section 3 of this order,

effective immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney General,

if the Attorney General determines, in consultation with the Secretary

of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, that:

(A) the laws of the country, the regional economic integration organization,

or the regional economic integration organization’s member countries

require appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals intelligence activities

for United States persons’ personal information that is transferred

from the United States to the territory of the country or a member country

of the regional economic integration organization;
(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the

regional economic integration organization’s member countries of the regional

economic integration organization permit, or are anticipated to permit,

the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between

the territory of that country or those member countries and the territory

of the United States; and

(C) such designation would advance the national interests of the United

States.

(ii) The Attorney General may revoke or amend such a designation, effective

immediately or on a date specified by the Attorney General, if the Attorney

General determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary

of Commerce, and the Director, that:

(A) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the

regional economic integration organization’s member countries do not provide

appropriate safeguards in the conduct of signals intelligence activities

for United States persons’ personal information that is transferred from

the United States to the territory of the country or to a member country

of the regional economic integration organization;

(B) the country, the regional economic integration organization, or the

regional economic integration organization’s member countries do not permit

the transfer of personal information for commercial purposes between

the territory of that country or those member countries and the territory

of the United States; or

(C) such designation is not in the national interests of the United States.

Sec. 4. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) ‘‘Appropriate remediation’’ means lawful measures designed to fully

redress an identified covered violation regarding a specific complainant

and limited to measures designed to address that specific complainant’s

complaint, taking into account the ways that a violation of the kind identified

have customarily been addressed. Such measures may include, depending

on the specific covered violation at issue, curing through administrative

measures violations found to have been procedural or technical errors relating

to otherwise lawful access to or handling of data, terminating acquisition

of data where collection is not lawfully authorized, deleting data that had

been acquired without lawful authorization, deleting the results of inappropriately

conducted queries of otherwise lawfully collected data, restricting

access to lawfully collected data to those appropriately trained, or recalling

intelligence reports containing data acquired without lawful authorization

or that were otherwise disseminated in a manner inconsistent with United

States law. Appropriate remediation shall be narrowly tailored to redress

the covered violation and to minimize adverse impacts on the operations

of the Intelligence Community and the national security of the United States.

(b) ‘‘Bulk collection’’ means the authorized collection of large quantities

of signals intelligence data that, due to technical or operational considerations,

is acquired without the use of discriminants (for example, without

the use of specific identifiers or selection terms).

(c) ‘‘Counterintelligence’’ shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive

Order 12333.

(d) ‘‘Covered violation’’ means a violation that:

(i) arises from signals intelligence activities conducted after the date of

this order regarding data transferred to the United States from a qualifying

state after the effective date of the Attorney General’s designation for

such state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;

(ii) adversely affects the complainant’s individual privacy and civil liberties

interests; and

(iii) violates one or more of the following:

(A) the United States Constitution;
(B) the applicable sections of FISA or any applicable FISC-approved

procedures;

(C) Executive Order 12333 or any applicable agency procedures pursuant

to Executive Order 12333;

(D) this order or any applicable agency policies and procedures issued

or updated pursuant to this order (or the policies and procedures identified

in section 2(c)(iv)(A) of this order before they are updated pursuant to

section 2(c)(iv)(B) of this order);

(E) any successor statute, order, policies, or procedures to those identified

in section 4(d)(iii)(B)–(D) of this order; or

(F) any other statute, order, policies, or procedures adopted after the

date of this order that provides privacy and civil liberties safeguards

with respect to United States signals intelligence activities within the

scope of this order, as identified in a list published and updated by

the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.

(e) ‘‘Foreign intelligence’’ shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive

Order 12333.

(f) ‘‘Intelligence’’ shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive

Order 12333.

(g) ‘‘Intelligence Community’’ and ‘‘elements of the Intelligence Community’’

shall have the same meaning as they have in Executive Order 12333.

(h) ‘‘National security’’ shall have the same meaning as it has in Executive

Order 13526 of December 29, 2009 (Classified National Security Information).

(i) ‘‘Non-United States person’’ means a person who is not a United

States person.

(j) ‘‘Personnel of the United States or of its allies or partners’’ means

any current or former member of the Armed Forces of the United States,

any current or former official of the United States Government, and any

other person currently or formerly employed by or working on behalf of

the United States Government, as well as any current or former member

of the military, current or former official, or other person currently or formerly

employed by or working on behalf of an ally or partner.

(k) ‘‘Qualifying complaint’’ means a complaint, submitted in writing, that:

(i) alleges a covered violation has occurred that pertains to personal information

of or about the complainant, a natural person, reasonably believed

to have been transferred to the United States from a qualifying state

after the effective date of the Attorney General’s designation for such

state, as provided in section 3(f)(i) of this order;

(ii) includes the following basic information to enable a review: information

that forms the basis for alleging that a covered violation has occurred,

which need not demonstrate that the complainant’s data has in fact been

subject to United States signals intelligence activities; the nature of the

relief sought; the specific means by which personal information of or

about the complainant was believed to have been transmitted to the United

States; the identities of the United States Government entities believed

to be involved in the alleged violation (if known); and any other measures

the complainant pursued to obtain the relief requested and the response

received through those other measures;

(iii) is not frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith;

(iv) is brought on behalf of the complainant, acting on that person’s

own behalf, and not as a representative of a governmental, nongovernmental,

or intergovernmental organization; and

(v) is transmitted by the appropriate public authority in a qualifying

state, after it has verified the identity of the complainant and that the

complaint satisfies the conditions of section 5(k)(i)–(iv) of this order.
(l) ‘‘Significant incident of non-compliance’’ shall mean a systemic or

intentional failure to comply with a principle, policy, or procedure of applicable

United States law that could impugn the reputation or integrity of

an element of the Intelligence Community or otherwise call into question

the propriety of an Intelligence Community activity, including in light of

any significant impact on the privacy and civil liberties interests of the

person or persons concerned.

(m) ‘‘United States person’’ shall have the same meaning as it has in

Executive Order 12333.

(n) ‘‘Validated intelligence priority’’ shall mean, for most United States

signals intelligence collection activities, a priority validated under the process

described in section 2(b)(iii) of this order; or, in narrow circumstances

(for example, when such process cannot be carried out because of a need

to address a new or evolving intelligence requirement), shall mean a priority

set by the President or the head of an element of the Intelligence Community

in accordance with the criteria described in section 2(b)(iii)(A)(1)–(3) of

this order to the extent feasible.

(o) ‘‘Weapons of mass destruction’’ shall have the same meaning as it

has in Executive Order 13526.

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed

to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or

the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including

orders of and procedures approved by the FISC, and subject to the

availability of appropriations.

(c) Nothing in this order precludes the application of more privacy-protective

safeguards for United States signals intelligence activities that would

apply in the absence of this order. In the case of any conflict between

this order and other applicable law, the more privacy-protective safeguards

shall govern the conduct of signals intelligence activities, to the maximum

extent allowed by law.

(d) Nothing in this order prohibits elements of the Intelligence Community

from disseminating information relating to a crime for law enforcement

purposes; disseminating warnings of threats of killing, serious bodily injury,

or kidnapping; disseminating cyber threat, incident, or intrusion response

information; notifying victims or warning potential victims of crime; or

complying with dissemination obligations required by statute, treaty, or court

order, including orders of and procedures approved by the FISC or other

court orders.

(e) The collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning

United States persons is governed by multiple legal and policy requirements,

such as those required by FISA and Executive Order 12333. This order

is not intended to alter the rules applicable to United States persons adopted

pursuant to FISA, Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law.

(f) This order shall apply to signals intelligence activities consistent with

the scope of PPD–28’s application to such activities prior to PPD–28’s partial

revocation by the national security memorandum issued concurrently with

this order. To implement this subsection, the head of each agency containing

an element of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the Attorney

General and the Director, is hereby delegated the authority to issue guidance,

which may be classified, as appropriate, as to the scope of application

of this order with respect to the element or elements of the Intelligence

Community within their agency. The CLPO and the Data Protection Review

Court, in carrying out the functions assigned to it under this order, shall

treat such guidance as authoritative and binding.
(g) Nothing in this order confers authority to declassify or disclose classified

national security information except as authorized pursuant to Executive

Order 13526 or any successor order. Consistent with the requirements of

Executive Order 13526, the CLPO, the Data Protection Review Court, and

the special advocates shall not have authority to declassify classified national

security information, nor shall they disclose any classified or otherwise

privileged or protected information except to authorized and appropriately

cleared individuals who have a need to know the information.

(h) This order creates an entitlement to submit qualifying complaints

to the CLPO and to obtain review of the CLPO’s decisions by the Data

Protection Review Court in accordance with the redress mechanism established

in section 3 of this order. This order is not intended to, and does

not, create any other entitlement, right, or benefit, substantive or procedural,

enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States,

its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or

any other person. This order is not intended to, and does not, modify

the availability or scope of any judicial review of the decisions rendered

through the redress mechanism, which is governed by existing law.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 7, 2022.