John Roland Redman was born on January 31, 1898, in Reno, Nevada to Mrs. Katherine Williams Redman, and Joseph R. Redman. He received an appointment to the Naval Academy in 1915 and was commissioned as an Ensign on June 7, 1918.
In November 1920, he started his duty duty career and served in the USS NEW YORK (BB 34), followed by USS PAUL HAMILTON (DD 307), the USS TATTNALL (DD 125) and the USS LaVALLETTE (DD 315).
He returned to the United States for instruction in radio engineering. He was ordered to Asiatic Station, and reported for duty on the staff of the Commander Destroyer Squadron, Asiatic Fleet, until October 1926, when he joined the USS ARIZONA (BB 39). Detached in June 1927, he was then assigned as the Assistant District Communication Officer, Twelfth Naval District. In August 1929, he reported as Executive Officer of the USS ZEILIN (DD 313), followed by the USS CLAXTON (DD 140) and the USS EVANS (DD 78).
Between June 1932 and May 1934, he was assigned to the Office of Naval Communications, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., after which he held two staff positions until June 1936. On February 5, 1938, he assumed command of the USS DALE (DD 353). In December of the same year Redman was relieved and was transferred to duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. He was serving in the Inter-department Communication Liaison Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
From February to October, 1942, he served as Head, Radio Intelligence Section, Division of Naval Communications. In October, he joined the staff of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Areas. On May 2, 1945, he assumed command of the USS MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59).
He became Commander of the Naval Receiving Station, Treasure Island, San Francisco, California, until January 1947 at which time he was designated Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff to the Commander Western Sea Frontier. In July 1947, he assumed duty as Deputy Commander Western Sea Frontier, until August 1949, when he reported as Director of Naval Communications, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy. In August 1953, he again reported as Deputy Commander Western Sea Frontier.
He became Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, with headquarters in San Francisco, California, on February 8, 1954. On October 1, 1957, he was transferred to the Retired List of the U.S. Navy and was advanced to the rank of Vice Admiral on the basis of a combat award.
Vice Admiral Redman’s first wife was the former Elizabeth Clemens, also of Reno. They were married in Reno on April 30, 1924. Mrs. Redman died in the Oakland, California, on October 14, 1955. They had one daughter, Mary Elizabeth. Admiral Redman was re-married in Fresno, California, on December 10, 1956 to the former Miss Lillian Peterson.
Vice Admiral Redman died on May 29, 1970. He was 72 years old.
Source: Echoes of Our Past
Station HYPO 
31 January 2019 at 16:49
Thanks for posting this biographical sketch of Vice Admiral John R. Redman, Mario. Do you know, or do you know of someone who may know, the exact date in February 1942 when John R. Redman relieved Captain Safford as head of OP-20-G? I’d also like to know when Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes was relieved by Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman. I’d love to be able to obtain a history of the Office of Naval Communications, if such is available. Thanks very much, and thanks again for posting this biography of VADM John R. Redman!
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5 April 2019 at 18:11
I have read some uncomplimentary things about the Redman brothers’ conclusions and advice in the early part of the war, particularly in the run up to Midway. This was critically important to the Pacific outcome at the time. Any views?
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8 August 2020 at 00:11
https://stationhypo.com/2016/11/17/officer-who-broke-japanese-war-codes-gets-belated-honor/
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27 August 2020 at 13:17
Redman brothers were snakes- plotted against Rochefort- Redmans should have been busted and kicked out of the Navy- worthless , self serving jackssses .
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27 August 2020 at 19:52
Anytime someone, anyone wishes to make the kind of critical remark “Anonymous” above has done and doesn’t let people know who he/she really is, is, in my opinion a coward. My advice to Mr./Ms. Anonymous is not to base what you think about the Redmans on what was written about them in “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets. That book’s editor was the late Bruce Lee (not the actor). Lee also edited, posthumously, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor and coauthored Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement with the late Henry C. Clausen. For an interesting exercise in finding lies that become history, read Clausen’s testimony to the JCC on Pearl Harbor after the war and compare his public testimony with the nonsense written in Pearl Harbor Final Judgement. Two specific areas of concern are in what the book states about the three general officer members of the Army Pearl Harbor Board from 1944, and what Clausen testified to about the so-called winds execute message. (The Clausen Investigation found evidence, it’s in part 35 of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, that British intelligence in Manila, yes, Manila, had furnished one of their agents on Oahu information that the winds execute had been intercepted. The “(Gerald S.) Wilkinson telegram” was carbon copied to Captain Irving H. Mayfied, LtCol. George W. Bicknell, and Robert L. Shivers. This was done prior to 7 Dec. 1941. My conclusion is that Bruce Lee played a major part after the fact in the cover up of Pearl Harbor.) Andrew “Andy” McKane IV.
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15 December 2020 at 01:33
I would like to research more about this topic, and would be interested in hearing what sources or books you might recommend (@pearlharbormckane). I am related to John Redman, although never knew him. I can probably get you the dates you ask about from my father, his grandson.
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16 December 2020 at 19:15
Dear Mr. or Ms. Christensen: Thank you very much for contacting me through the Station HYPO blog. I’m elated to hear from a member of the Redman family. Unfortunately or fortunately, at the present time I’m on Oahu without a proper desktop computer and without our research files and also with our library of Pearl Harbor, Intelligence and Communications Intelligence related publications. My wife and I live on the Island of Molokai and come over to Oahu each year for the activities surrounding the 7th of December. We will fly back to Molokai this coming Friday afternoon. I’ll give you my contact information so you can contact me directly. Cellphone is: 808-658-5137; email address is: amckane4@reagan.com.
I believe the Redman brothers, both John and Joseph, were given a phony rap in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. What’s been claimed about them isn’t that much different from what was (and still is) claimed about Richmond Kelly Turner, Sherman Miles, Kendall J Fielder, and various others who are involved in the Pearl Harbor story.
It’s my belief—much stronger word to use than “opinion” would be—that in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and in order to cover up the high degree of intelligence, mostly communications intelligence the Navy had on Japan’s plans and intentions, an alternate “history” was created to make it appear there were many failures within our military, both Army and Navy, that resulted in America’s failure to predict the possibility (actually probability) of a “surprise” Japanese raid on the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Oahu’s airbases at the outbreak of war. (U.S. war plans from both Oahu and Washington, D.C. are very specific in realizing such an attack was likely at the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States.)
I’ve read all 39-volumes of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings. I have great respect for every Army and Navy officer in both Washington and Hawaii that was serving in any position of great responsibility in the period leading up to the Japanese attack. I’ve studied these people as well as the events themselves carefully and with total resolve since October 1983. My interest in Pearl Harbor history dates back to 1955-1956 when the McKane family first lived on Oahu. I was about 7 years old when I came under the spell of Pearl Harbor. It is, to this day, my greatest interest in life.
A major reason it’s taken over 36 years to seriously research U.S. entry into WWII and to still not have a book or even an article in publication on the subject are problems with my own conscience and my sincere desire to never write or say anything that will be harmful to the Armed Forces of the United States and to them men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. I can be extremely critical when I suspect incompetence, inability, or bad conduct is involved on someone’s part. But I have yet to find any example of this in the period leading up to the events of 7 December 1941. It’s my belief our decision makers allowed “a small sacrifice” to unify the American people behind the war effort. I am not a critic of this, as I believe, in the strategic sense, it saved millions of lives, both here and in other nations.
The type font on this miserable laptop computer of mine is so small I cannot reliably read what I’ve written here. Please forgive me for any errors of grammar, etc. And please contact me directly after I’ve returned to my home on Molokai. You can call me anytime Saturday. My wife and I will be in church on Sunday, but after church I’ll be available to speak with you. I very much hope to hear from you!! I’d also appreciate being able to talk with or write to your father, the grandson of John R. Redman.
Thank you very much, Courtney, for contacting me, and thanks to Mario for all that he does with the Station HYPO blog and website.
Most sincerely yours,
Andy McKane
PO Box 166
Maunaloa, Hawaii 96770
I also have Pearl Harbor McKane and Andrew “Andy” McKane Facebook pages
We don’t get mail delivery to our home on Molokai. The PO Box is our mailing address.
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19 December 2021 at 16:09
The Redman brothers were despicable academy graduates whose WWII activities jeopardized the more accurate works of the Hawaii code breakers. The ring-knocker cabal King, the Redmans, and the BuOrd officers prolonged the war by their interference with the work of more capable non-academy graduates. Many historians are now realizing and publicly recognizing the road blocks used show their efforts in a more favorable light while glossing over their mistakes. The best thing that ever happened to the NAVY was increasing their ROTC programs thereby diluting the effect familiarity over merit. A recent meeting with a USC/ROTC Navy Captain referred to USNA as a trade school while in the presence of a USNA grad who transferred over to the USAF for quicker advancement. He agreed with the characterization. He flew O-2s in Vietnam.
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21 December 2021 at 23:01
While there have undoubtedly been a few graduates of the Naval Academy and Military Academy who have had questionable motives in some of the things they did or didn’t do during their service careers, I’m deeply suspicious of many of the negative statements I’ve read over the years about the two Redman brothers.
In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, many statements were made by various individuals that, in my opinion, were nothing less than outright lies used as explanations for how the available intelligence failed to alert high-level officers in both Washington and Hawaii. I hope to learn as much as can possibly be learned about the Redman brothers and the work they did in the Office of Naval Communications before, during and after World War II.
Another naval officer who has also been severely criticized over the years is Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. On 22 June 1995, retired Vice Admiral David C. Richardson—the former custodian of the so-called Kimmel Letter—fed me a load of nonsense about what he referred to as “the two (Richmond Kelly) Turner’s.” He said that “Turner’s failures” (in his alleged handling of intelligence) in the period leading up to 7 December 1941 changed the man. I asked Admiral Richardson, “Have you ever read THE AMPHIBIANS CAME TO CONQUER: THE STORY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER? Admiral Richardson did not answer the question. Instead, he went on blaming Turner for “the intelligence failure” that resulted in Pearl Harbor. This discussion took place at the Coronado, California home of Captain Harry B. Stark. Vice Admiral Richardson and Captain Stark both graduated with the Naval Academy’s class of 1936. In the rank of lieutenant commander, Harry Stark served as aide to then Rear Admiral/Vice Admiral Turner during the middle phase of the Pacific War. He spent 13 months working for “Kelly Turner.” They had a very close relationship. Captain Stark had nothing but praise for Admiral Turner. He told me privately and while we were talking in Admiral Richardson’s presence that Turner could be rough on people who didn’t perform the way he believed officers and enlisted men should perform in the line of duty. (Captain Stark gave me one such example that happened during the invasion of Saipan in 1944. Turner chewed Stark out for not reporting to him sooner about a particular incident. Captain Stark said he replied to Turner that “If you stood in one place on the flag bridge, I’d have found you sooner.” He went on to say he could see Turner’s “grin in the moonlight” when he rebutted the admiral’s criticism.)
Many truly gifted individuals, male and female, have attended and graduated from America’s service academies. A few of these individuals may have been tyrants in the minds of their subordinates. Perhaps a few undoubtedly were tyrants.
As a twenty-three year old corpsman (E-3 “hospitalman”) I served about six months on a SOQ surgical ward (26-6C) at Naval Hospital San Diego. My patients ranged in rank from warrant officer to vice admiral. I was then and remain to this day deeply impressed by the manner in which these active duty and retired officers treated me. Some were academy graduates. Some were not. Every one of those patients earned my respect and devotion.
Criticism made against the Redman brothers in “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets is, in my opinion, more counter-information than factual information.
Should Mr. Davis or anyone else wish to contact me with details about the Redman brothers or anything else related to Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into the Second World War, I can be reached at P.O. Box 166, Maunaloa, Hawaii 96770.
Andy McKane, 1301 (Hawaiian time), Tuesday, 21 December 2021
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29 June 2022 at 03:24
There is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that the Redman brothers plotted to destroy Rochefort in order that they get the credit for Midway victory . It’s a shame the Redmans were not found out while still alive ( and preferably on active duty ). Of course , one cannot omit Admiral Wenger as one of the conspirators . As far as Turner ? I do not know .
Rochefort saved our country ( along with his team at HYPO) with his incredible work leading up to Midway .
Redmans were self centered pricks . There’s just too much evidence to suggest otherwise .
Nimitz should have done more ! I will always believe that . King was played as a fool .
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30 June 2022 at 02:07
It’s my opinion—as a Pearl Harbor historian, as I’m not a communications specialist—that in the aftermath of 7 December 1941 a large effort was put into covering up the high quality intelligence the United States had prior to the Japanese raid on the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Let’s refer to Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s own words, published back in 1963, about the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy’s communications organization (OP-20):
“Upon assuming command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on 31 December 1941, I found a well-functioning communication system capable of great expansion. Could it expand rapidly enough to handle the far-reaching demands suddenly thrown upon it? It could and did, to my great satisfaction….At the same time, the Communications Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, under Rear Adm. Joseph R. Redman, supplied trained operators. Thus the Pacific Fleet Communications Officer, Captain, later Rear Adm. John R. Redman, could expand Pacific Ocean area communications to meet all operating, logistic, intelligence, and other command requirements. This gigantic task was accomplished so efficiently that the Pearl Harbor headquarters was able to exercise complete and effective control of the operations of the far-ranging forces on, under, and above the sea. The radio silence usually imposed upon the forces afloat made absolute confidence in the integrity of our communications system a matter of paramount importance. This confidence was earned and well merited.” Quoted from Nimitz’s Introduction to HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY, with an Introduction by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Prepared by Captain L.S. Howeth, USN (Ret.), under the auspices of Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval History, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963.
In the aftermath of the events of 7 December 1941 and the period leading up to that date, I believe many fabrications were made about the alleged failures of various Army and Navy officers. Men who were in the positions they were in in 1940-1945 because of their ability and their professional conduct. In addition to many falsehoods being made about many of these individuals, various documents were also altered after the fact to cover up what was known prior to 7 December 1941. After thirty-eight years of serious study into the subject of Pearl Harbor, I do not believe the individuals in the Navy and War Departments in Washington, D.C. and in Hawaii on the Island of Oahu were anything less than fully professional.
Andrew “Andy” McKane IV, 1606 (Hawaiian time), Wednesday, 29 June 2022, P.O. Box 166, Maunaloa, Hawaii 96770
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5 September 2023 at 01:07
Admiral Nimitz should have done more to protect Rochefort . Am curious as to why he didn’t. Nimitz knew the truth
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5 September 2023 at 04:10
I suggest “the truth” is that, in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and in order to make it appear as if the U.S. Navy’s communications intelligence was not at all reliable up to about the time of the Battle of Midway, certain counter-information was put into the public record. I believe the people responsible for producing this counter-information were counter-intelligence specialists within the Office of Naval Intelligence. (One gifted officer who played a role in this was Arthur H. McCollum. Another was Edwin T. Layton.)
Before believing that Rochefort was sacked from the ComInt unit at Pearl Harbor by the Redman brothers, read Rochefort’s testimony in the Pearl Harbor attack hearings (PHA Part 7, p. 4679. Rochefort appeared before the JCC on 15 & 16 February 1946, see PHA07, pp. 4672-4710. There were 8 investigations into Pearl Harbor conducted between December 1941 and June 1946. Only two of the approximate 333 witnesses testified (or gave affidavits) in seven of those eight investigations. These two officers were J.J. Rochefort and E.T. Layton.)
Senator Alben Barkley (Chairman of the JCC): “What is your assignment now?”
Captain Rochefort: “On duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, sir.”
Barkley: “Here in Washington?”
Rochefort: “Here in Washington.”
Barkley: “How long have you had that assignment?”
Rochefort: “Since approximately the middle of December 1945, sir.”
Barkley: “And prior to that, where have you been?”
Rochefort: “I have been ordered to sea duty. sir, at my own request in October.”
Barkley: “How long after the attack on Pearl Harbor before you were assigned to some other place?”
Rochefort: “In October 1942, sir.”
The above exchange between Captain Rochefort and Senate Majority Leader Alben W. Barkley (later to serve as Truman’s vice president) is published in Part 7 of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, see p. 4679.
Despite the disinformation that’s been widely circulated (mostly as misinformation) since about the time Captain W.J. Holmes’ Doubled-Edged Secrets was published by the U.S. Naval Institute, the story has been told again and again that Rochefort was relieved as officer in charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl because of infighting in the Navy Department–largely brought on by “the Redman Brothers” (both of whom were in OP-20G at the time)
Rochefort was relieved at his own request. I suspect that request was largely because of how Rochefort’s and 20-G’s cryptanalysts material was used for means Rochefort, Safford, and most others in communications intelligence never considered it would be used. (Safford, himself was relieved as head of OP-20G in February 1942. Safford’s relief was made at his own recommendation.)
In the fall of 1941, Safford drew up a list of OP-20G officers he believed would request getting out of communications intelligence after the U.S. was actively involved in WWII. (I need to request a copy of Safford’s list. I’ve heard of it and read of it, but I’ve never personally read the list.)
There isn’t the slightest doubt in my mind that naval intelligence and naval communications accurately predicted where and how Japan’s first strike would fall. And there is no doubt in my mind that after the fact, with the arrival of SecNav (Frank Knox) on Oahu several days after Pearl Harbor, efforts were made so as to cover-up what was known at the highest level on Oahu prior to 7 December 1941.
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that what happened on Oahu on 7 Dec. 1941—in the manner in which it happened—was conceived as a calculated risk. The risk was taken to unify the American people to fighting and winning the Second World War. Next month, by the way, October 2023, marks the 40th anniversary since beginning research on U.S. entry into WWII. But my interest in this subject began in the mid-1950’s when my dad was stationed at sub base, Pearl Harbor. That interest grew considerably the second time the McKane family lived on Oahu from 1959 to 1961. That’s when I began reading Samuel Eliot Morison’s HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II. That reading initially began while I was in the 6th grade at the Chester W. Nimitz elementary school, Pearl Harbor.
I believe both Redman brothers were professional naval officers. Ditto, Richmond Kelly Turner, director of war plans in the Navy Department from October 1940 to 12 June 1942. I fully believe the U.S. Naval Academy over the years since its founding, has produced some of our country’s greatest leaders. The same can be said of the U.S. Military Academy.
As the late Captain Harry B. Stark long ago told me: “Anything that’s ever happened should be written up. But not everything should be published.” I plan to finish writing my first book on Pearl Harbor before the end of this year. Unless it is deemed to be detrimental to our military services, I will find a publisher who will publish it.
My respect for the men and women who serve in our military services is high (to say the least). A private, seamen, sergeant or petty officer go into battle thinking of the lives of the men and women around him/her. Flag and general officers have to focus more on strategic decision making. Decisions that can and often do lead to death of some of their subordinates. In the case of U.S. entry into WWII, I fully, absolutely, believe our leaders did the right thing and used the best possible strategy. I very deeply admire these people!
Andrew “Andy” McKane IV
P.O. Box 166
Maunaloa, Hawaii 96770
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