On March 22, 1982 – Ground was broken in Washington D.C. for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial designed by Maya Lin of Yale.
Some little known information regarding the Memorial:
Continue reading “Vietnam Memorial Wall”
Master Chief Best spent the majority of his younger years traveling around the world with his parents, a career Army family. He graduated from high school in 1964 and subsequently enlisted in the U.S. Navy.
Continue reading “Honoring CTRCM (Ret.) Richard O. Best, USN, Seventh Force Master Chief for the Naval Security Group Command”
It is with profound sadness that we share the passing of Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jerry Clifford Mills, of Pensacola, Florida, who departed this life on March 10, 2026, at the age of 79. His loss is deeply felt by his family, friends, shipmates, and all who had the privilege of knowing him. Those wishing to honor his memory are invited to share condolences and reflections with his loved ones, offering comfort and support during this difficult time.
Continue reading “Remembering Retired Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jerry Clifford Mills”
On March 16, 1981, a U.S. Air Force RC-135 Cobra Ball II (#61-2664) was lost after returning from a reconnaissance mission off the Soviet Kamchatka peninsula.
The aircraft departed Eielson for Shemya with 24 souls onboard. While attempting to land, aircraft encountered a rapid decline in weather resulted in a crash landing. Six men lost their lives and several Medals were awarded for bravery.
By Retired Captain Ros Poplar, USN
As we face the challenges of keeping the Straits of Hormuz open, “Quantity is indeed a Quality all of its own “
As I was reminded by Shipmate Michael Morano this A.M. 1987 marked the high point of the “600 Ship Navy,” with total numbers reaching 594 combatants. Included within those numbers were 119 frigates, 69 destroyers, and 35 cruisers, all of various classes.
Continue reading “Quantity Has a Quality All Its Own: Lessons from the 600-Ship Navy to Hormuz Today”
Executive Summary:
This paper argues that the U.S. intelligence community failed to anticipate the 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran because it relied on a narrow rational actor model that equated Iran’s stability with the Shah’s personal authority, ignoring deeper social, religious, economic, and military fractures. By contrast, applying principles of chaos theory and self-organizing criticality reveals Iran in the 1970s as a metastable system marked by weak cohesion, escalating conflict energy, sensitivity to small triggering events, and nonlinear dynamics. Seemingly minor incidents—such as protests, political debates over arms sales, or the growing influence of Ruhollah Khomeini—interacted in unpredictable ways that amplified instability and ultimately led to regime collapse. While chaos theory would not have predicted the precise timing of the Shah’s departure, it would have highlighted structural vulnerabilities and warned policymakers that Iran was approaching critical instability, allowing for better-informed strategic adjustments.
Station HYPO 