By Lieutenant Commander Brian Adornato, U.S. Navy Reserve

“The Navy emphatically acknowledges the need for a larger, more lethal force.”

“We cannot manifest a bigger traditional Navy in a few short years.”

These two quotes from the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) Navigation Plan 2024 (NavPlan 24) highlight an intractable problem for the U.S. Navy. The service does not have enough ships. It also has too little time to build more, considering Admiral Phil Davidson’s warning that 2027 will start a period of high risk for war with China—a timeline NavPlan 24 affirmed.

The high-quality Navy the Navigation Plan envisions will have to handle the heaviest fighting in the hottest areas. But in any conflict with China, plenty of important work outside the first island chain could be done by less-capable vessels. A recent article in Proceedings laid out the threats that could strain domestic maritime defenses during a Pacific war, including migration, drugs, pandemics, environmental catastrophes, and terrorism. There also would be opportunities to disrupt China’s extended supply lines in South America, and even to capture prizes. Further, the United States would need to have logistics support for everything from sealift to supporting expeditionary bases.

A “crash fleet” cobbled together by all the maritime services after the outbreak of war could address these lower-end challenges and opportunities. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) busy marshaling thousands of ships for an invasion of Taiwan, the main foe of the U.S. crash fleet could be less-capable threats such as Chinese merchant ships and overseas fishing vessels. Any ship, from any maritime service, that can transport people or equipment, carry a helicopter or boarding team, or threaten a rogue trawler could play a part. 

Leaders of the U.S. Sea Services must prepare now to acquire a crash fleet by adopting four practices: Lose nothing; arm everything; buy anything; and use everyone.

Lose Nothing

The Navy has 60 inactive ships throughout the country. However, practically none of the vessels receives any maintenance. When the Navy considered reactivating some stored frigates to help with antidrug duties, it estimated work on each hull would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. That would tie up substantial sums of money and shipyard resources for not much capability.

The Navy plans to decommission 27 surface ships—from cruisers and littoral combat ships to logistics ships—in fiscal years (FYs) 2025 and 2026. All these ships should be retained at an “as is” level of maintenance while inactive so they are cheaper and faster to reactivate. Even if their combat systems are not updated to the newest available baselines, these ships have value. They would be the first component of the crash fleet.

The Navy should follow the Maritime Administration’s (MarAd’s) Ready Reserve Force (RRF) model for inactive vessel maintenance. The Navy transfers about $13 million per year to MarAd for each ship in the RRF to ensure the fleet can be activated in 10 or fewer days. Costs to maintain Navy ships in a similar status would be a bit higher, but that cost could be mitigated by longer activation times and by allowing combat systems to degrade. Ships maintained in “as is” status would be much easier to activate than ships in the Navy’s current inactive fleet.

Arm Everything

In 2018, then-MarAd head retired Rear Admiral Mark Buzby said MarAd sealift ships likely would not have escorts in the event of a conflict. He advised the ships to “go fast and stay quiet.” Unfortunately, no amount of speed or silence will allow them to hide. Between its 17,000-strong overseas fishing fleet (which includes at least 300 maritime militia vessels), the 5,000 commercial ships it controls, 500 China Coast Guard cutters, and 370 PLAN ships, China can cover a lot of ocean with basic commercial radar and a set of binoculars. Add ubiquitous commercial satellite imaging and other Chinese platforms, and there is simply nowhere to hide.

Arming vessels the U.S. government already owns is the crash fleet’s second task. MarAd administers approximately 90 ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet, and Military Sealift Command (MSC) has 125 ships. The Coast Guard has 69 buoy tenders, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 15 oceanic research ships also could be brought into Coast Guard service. These vessels are either unarmed or very lightly armed. Nevertheless, according to the Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual, they meet the standard as either warships or vessels that could be “attacked and destroyed by warships, either with or without prior warning.” If they can be attacked, they should be armed.

These ships should be able to defend against low-end air threats and terrorists or enemy trawlers. The block 1B Mk 15 gun-based close-in weapon system is ideal for this role. It has a self-contained, highly automated kill chain with air and surface capabilities. The downsides are that it is expensive at $20 million, lacks punch against surface targets, and could be difficult to produce in quantity. Many other weapons in production can complement or supplant the Mk-15, including Javelin anti-armor missile systems, VAMPIRE missile systems, M2 50-caliber machine guns, and Madis Mk-1 anti-air mounts, just to name a few.

Missiles such as the Naval Strike Missile or the Mk 70 would fit on many of these ships, but fully using their over-the-horizon capability requires a complete kill chain to find and track long-distance targets. The ships also would need to be commissioned as warships to use these systems. If the crash fleet could tap into data gathered by high-end ships using the cooperative engagement capability, this could be a viable option. However, the priority should be self-contained, shorter-range systems.

Buy Anything

Former Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro described U.S. shipyard capability as “inadequate to pace our 21st-century competitors.” Many point to the substantial disparity in oceangoing commercial shipbuilding orderbooks between China (more than 1,700 ships) and the United States (5). However, this does not tell the whole story of American shipyards.

A recent survey by WorkBoat Magazine found that U.S. shipyards sold hundreds of nonmilitary vessels built in 45 separate yards. Patrol and fire/rescue boats sold to state and local governments were common, as were tugboats. U.S. shipyards built a couple dozen offshore supply vessels and a like number of small passenger ships. The maritime services should purchase as many of these vessels of opportunity as commercial industry would be willing to sell. The Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Navy all could find uses for these vessels, which could form the third component of the crash fleet.

The Marine Corps’ Installations and Logistics 2030 calls for the service to experiment with “integration of existing maritime platforms” to support expeditionary advanced base operations, and there are experiments underway to expand the use of small boats. Pilot boats and patrol boats could provide maritime maneuver for the Marine Corps’ Marine Littoral Regiments. Tugs and barges also could maneuver equipment.

For the Coast Guard, patrol boats could supplement search-and-rescue and law-enforcement missions close to shore. Tugboats with crane barges already are used for buoy maintenance. Offshore supply vessels (OSVs) and even dinner boats could carry out logistical functions to keep Coast Guard cutters deployed longer.

Their size and capabilities make OSVs a natural fit for the Navy. Reports from 2022 indicated more than 300 of these vessels are inactive in the Gulf of Mexico. Considering active OSVs are valued at about $13 million, the Navy could purchase many of these inactive vessels at a reasonable price. They could be heavily armed to threaten enemy merchant ships and their escorts or used for logistics.

In addition, the government should place follow-on orders for vessels already under construction. This could encourage the industrial base to purchase more equipment, which could be used for other ships. Fourteen shipyards had 30 larger tugboats and dredges under construction in 2023. If the government put in orders for these tugs and dredges, those shipyards could shift to building things like the low-profile vessels for the Marine Corps using the same labor and raw materials.

Use Everyone

The crash fleet would require substantial manning. Previously deactivated ships would need to fill approximately 5,000 billets. Adding armed guards to previously unarmed ships would require some 1,500 individuals, and another 2,000 would be needed if the government purchased all available nonmilitary vessels currently on order at commercial shipyards. Manning these vessels and addressing the existing shortfalls in the Navy, Coast Guard, MSC and MarAd would require an extra 31,500 individuals.

The Navy has about 46,000 Select Reservists (SelRes) who drill regularly. The Coast Guard has about 6,200. This is a large pool of reservists, but using them to bolster shipboard manning would present two problems. First, SelRes sailors already would have been assigned to commands in a mobilization, and those commands might not be able to release them for shipboard manning. Second, some portion of this group would be ineligible for mobilization. When the Navy activated its SurgeMain SELRES force to support naval shipyards during COVID, only 1,850 of 2,200 sailors were able to mobilize.

The Navy and Coast Guard will need to turn to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). This force does not train regularly, but its members are eligible for mobilization. The Navy has about 37,000 people in this status, and the Coast Guard has about 1,300. If more manpower were required beyond the IRR, the services could consider allowing retirees to mobilize voluntarily. Finally, the Coast Guard Auxiliary’s 26,000 trained volunteer members could take over some domestic Coast Guard duties.

The Catch Is the Cash

The good news is that Congress funds wars once they start. The bad news is that before then, budgets might be tight.

The key to a crash fleet is minimizing costs prior to the outbreak of conflict. If the potential for conflict with China peaks in 2027, the only activity that must be accomplished before then is maintaining about 27 inactive vessels, which would cost an estimated $540 million per year. Delaying acquisition of the future medium landing ship (LSM) would save $268 million. Given that the Navy canceled a request for proposals for the LSM in December 2024, this ship would not be ready by 2027 anyway. Further, a 2 percent cut to the “other procurement, Navy” line item would save $316 million while spreading cuts evenly across the service; and a 10 percent cut to basic research, much of which will not develop in time for 2027, would save $57 million.

Weapons to arm the crash fleet ideally would be purchased before the outbreak of conflict. Outfitting every existing MarAd, MSC, and NOAA ship and every Coast Guard buoy tender with a Mk 15 mount, and all the aforementioned vessels of opportunity with a pair of 50-caliber machine guns, would cost about $5.2 billion. Arming everything with 50-caliber mounts instead would cost about $20 million.

The Path Ahead

There are some efforts the maritime agencies could undertake now to prepare for the acquisition of a crash fleet.

  1. Add a chapter to the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual to address ships designed and built to commercial American Bureau of Shipping standards.
  • Use smaller vessels as targets in sinking exercises and shoot them with smaller weapons to simulate engagements with trawlers.
  • Maintain an inventory of all vessels being built in U.S. shipyards.
  • Modify the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense munition to be an offensive weapon. Even an unguided, contact-fused torpedo would give small ships an option to immobilize a wide variety of larger ships.
  • Create a crash fleet acquisition strategy. Consult the Army to learn lessons from their Mine Resistant Ambush Protected acquisition. The Naval War College is best positioned to lead this in consultation with the Sea Services.  
  • Retain as many vehicle-mounted weapons as possible from retired vehicles of all services.

A Feasible Bad Plan

Bolstering the fleet with retired warships, up-armed buoy tenders, and dinner boats with mounted machine guns is feasible but not ideal. The Sea Services should be racing to build as many ships as they can, but even if domestic production facilities were expanded immediately, they would not yield more than an additional ship or two by 2027. If laws were changed and foreign ships could be acquired (with no modification), that still would bring only a couple of ships into the fleet by 2027.

If current designs cannot be built quickly, can the maritime services design something that can? The saga of the LSM shows that this is unlikely. It has taken five years to decide how to buy a lightly armed, simple ship that the Director of Expeditionary Warfare described as “perhaps the most important investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base operations.” The current acquisition system probably cannot design something that can be built in large numbers by 2027.

The Navy is trying. It is laying the groundwork for collaboration with shipyards in Korea. The LSM looks to be a worthy successor to the LST. These efforts will succeed, but they will be too late to matter.

Brian Adornato

Lieutenant Commander Adornato is an engineering duty officer in the Navy Reserve. His civilian employer is the Coast Guard Surface Forces Logistics Center.

Source: usni.org