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Naval Intelligence Essay Contest—First Prize

Cosponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute and Naval Intelligence Professionals Submarine deployments to the Arctic would give China a significant asymmetric advantage. Naval intelligence must get ahead of this problem.

The U.S. Navy, in conjunction with the joint force and partners, must prepare for the deployment of Chinese submarines into the Arctic. Just as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap shaped Cold War warning doctrine, the Bering and Aleutian gaps may define an aspect of the United States’ China threat warning problem.

China is taking deliberate, steady steps to assert itself in the Arctic. Getting ahead of this problem cannot be achieved solely through changes to force structure. Naval intelligence must play a central role in detecting, tracking, and analyzing warning indicators; integrating cross-domain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); ensuring joint force awareness; and responding across multiple combatant command areas of responsibility.

China’s Polar Ambitions

China’s ambition to be a “polar great power” by 2035 is more than an economic one. Since declaring the 2035 goal, China has increased its participation in Arctic affairs, adopting the label “near-Arctic state,” modeled on the U.K.’s “The Arctic’s nearest neighbor.” China’s first Arctic policy white paper, published in 2018, described the region as a security concern. The paper added no specifics, likely to preserve flexibility until a more defined policy emerged.

China’s Arctic policy has evolved over the past decade and is included in President Xi Jinping’s concept of “comprehensive national security.” The boundary between international and domestic issues is very fluid within this concept, and issues that may arise in one pillar could cross into others. Ultimately, these pillars support and reinforce the central pillar of political security, which really means Chinese Communist Party regime stability.

The way China calculates its national interests also affects its Arctic policies. Chinese experts categorize national interests into core sovereign territory disputes, such as those involving Taiwan or the South and East China Seas, and overseas interests, which Beijing defends through diplomacy, agreements, or private security.

“Near seas defense” protects core interests with antiship ballistic missiles and attack submarines, while “far seas protection” safeguards overseas interests via supply ships, global bases, and aircraft carriers. Arctic submarine deployments straddle both near and far seas defense. Such deployments could support core objectives by delaying or deterring U.S. intervention in the Pacific or by providing second-strike capability.

China has defined the Arctic region as a “new security domain,” connecting the changing operational environment in the Arctic to food security, resource needs, and economic ambitions. Unable to assert sovereignty, China uses political, economic, scientific, and military levers to advance its aims. Politically, it has joined the Arctic Council as an observer and signed agreements such as the International Maritime Organization Polar Code. Economically, it promotes the “Polar Silk Road” and invests in Russian energy and shipping projects.

Russia’s isolation from the West since the war in Ukraine has deepened this partnership, but Beijing’s vision differs from Moscow’s. Russia seeks Arctic control and exploitation, while China views the region as part of a global network of trade routes and resource corridors. As reflected in its Science of Military Strategy 2020,

China frames the Arctic as a domain for strategic access rather than sovereignty. This allows China to provide limited economic and diplomatic support to Russia’s Arctic energy and shipping projects without fully committing and facing Western sanctions. This cautious, incremental approach ensures China benefits from Arctic access while preserving flexibility.

Scientifically, Chinese Arctic voyages with Xue Long–class icebreakers yield valuable data for undersea navigation and acoustics. Military-civil fusion ensures this data also feeds strategic programs such as nuclear icebreaker development, cold-weather aviation, and Arctic-capable navigation systems. The Tan Suo San Hao, a science vessel built in 10 months, can map the Arctic seabed for mineral exploitation or future undersea sensor placement.

China rarely publicly acknowledges the military dimension of its Arctic endeavors, but it is always there. Combined naval patrols with Russia, within 12 nautical miles of Alaskan islands, signal an intent to normalize a Chinese naval presence in the region. Militarizing Arctic access would give Beijing alternative shipping routes and a vector to threaten U.S. targets in wartime, forcing the United States to divide its attention between Pacific and Arctic approaches.

In short, China is acting—politically, economically, scientifically, and militarily—to prepare the ground for a continual Arctic presence. Naval intelligence must closely monitor China’s policy, guidelines, and objectives to understand its intent better. It must assess developing capabilities and provide the necessary insight before deployments become a reality.

China’s Strategic Rationale

From a strategic standpoint, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine deployments to the Arctic would give China a significant asymmetric advantage, while straining U.S. and allied maritime domain awareness. Compared to the Atlantic, where NATO has long monitored the GIUK Gap, the Pacific approach through the Bering Sea and Strait is poorly covered. Infrastructure is limited, forward-deployed assets are few, and the region is geographically isolated. If China were to use the Arctic as a patrol or loiter zone for nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines or guided-missile submarines (SSBNs or SSGNs), it could stretch U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces thin in an inhospitable region.

Alaska is a critical hub for U.S. power projection. It is home to the world’s largest concentration of fifth-generation fighters and a substantial number of soldiers who fall under U.S. Army Pacific and Indo-Pacific Command. A PLAN SSGN strike on Alaskan airfields could cripple or delay the deployment of these forces during a Pacific crisis. PLAN SSBNs in the Arctic also would give China a survivable second-strike capability, complicating U.S. Strategic Command’s planning. Strategic Command would have to reallocate limited SSBN-hunting assets to account for an additional launch axis from a platform capable of firing and then vanishing under the ice. This would dilute forces across two oceans, extend warning timelines, and complicate the defense architecture of U.S. nuclear deterrence.

Unlike the Atlantic, where Russian submarines face persistent NATO surveillance, the Arctic gives PLAN submarines more freedom to maneuver. If two PLAN SSBNs/SSGNs were detected passing east of the first island chain, one toward Hawaii and the other northeast toward the Bering Sea, U.S. forces would have to respond across multiple theaters, creating command-and-control friction. Failure to detect and respond to a Chinese submarine in the Arctic would endanger the United States and undermine allied confidence. Although there are operational and geographic challenges with such an endeavor, China’s Science of Military Strategy explicitly identifies that submarines as an asymmetric threat are difficult to defend against. Furthermore, the strategy notes that a submarine operating in the Arctic would need ballistic missiles with a range of only about 5,000 miles to reach almost any point in the United States and Europe—a range China already possesses.

Doctrinally, an Arctic deployment aligns with China’s assassin’s mace concept—a blend of advanced systems and tactics designed to strike at an adversary’s weaknesses. The deployment aims could include deterrence, blinding, paralysis, or decapitation. An Arctic-deployed PLAN SSGN or SSBN could deter U.S. force movements through the risk of escalation, blind the United States by destroying critical data centers, cripple key airfields, and even decapitate command-and-control headquarters.

The Navy is the only service capable of directly countering this threat. It must reverse its neglect of the Arctic and work with the joint force to reestablish persistent domain awareness. Naval intelligence should lead the effort, integrating hydrographic and bathymetric data, acoustic intelligence, and signals intelligence with geopolitical analysis to provide actionable assessments for decision-makers. Specifically, it should take the lead in advocating the following measures:

Reactivate Adak. The Navy should reopen Naval Air Facility Adak and deploy a rotational detachment of P-8s to the island as a “goalkeeper” against submarines attempting to cross the Aleutians into the Arctic. This would provide a maritime surveillance capability the Department of Defense (DoD) explicitly identified as a shortfall in its latest Arctic Strategy. Current bases in Okinawa, Hawaii, and Anchorage are too far away to sustain effective loiter times. From Adak, P-8s could detect and track Chinese submarines before they get in range to hold Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson or the U.S. mainland at risk of missile strike. Naval intelligence could use P-8 patrol data to develop “patterns of life” analysis to identify likely PLAN submarine routes.

Expand Alaskan Command to Arctic Command. The mission of the subunified U.S. Alaskan Command should expand to include the entire Arctic, and the organization should be renamed Arctic Command. This structure would build on existing infrastructure while adding capabilities to meet the expanded role. The Navy should significantly increase its presence within the expanded Arctic Command, establishing dedicated undersea warfare and ISR leads to coordinate with numbered fleets, the submarine force, and naval intelligence. This would ensure the maritime and undersea threat is integrated into operational planning and that intelligence flows between Arctic operations and naval intelligence, as well as the entire intelligence community. Expanding Alaska Command avoids the delays and political hurdles of creating a new command, while immediately enhancing cross-domain Arctic defense within Northern Command’s framework.

Create a new Arctic map. Even if not adopted for official use, DoD must use a new map to emphasize how the increased accessibility of the Arctic will allow for greater connections and, therefore, pose a greater threat from adversaries. China already has a map showing the Arctic Ocean’s ability to connect the continents of the world. To better understand and appreciate the strategic significance of the Arctic, DoD should consider replicating the Chinese map, which puts into perspective how close the landmasses truly are to each other, and that the Arctic Ocean, when navigable, can be used to reach other continents quickly. In Beijing’s preferred vertical projection, the Arctic Ocean is now an inland sea with New York, London, and Tokyo all equidistant to its shores. Naval intelligence should coordinate with the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to make such a product available for planning and targeting purposes.

Deploy unmanned platforms, too. The Navy should expand investment in unmanned undersea and surface vessels to complement fixed-node sensors and manned survey ships in the Arctic. Unmanned systems can operate in areas inaccessible to human crews and maintain longer dwell times, limited only by energy supply. As melting and shifting sea ice alter the operating environment, persistent and wide-ranging surveys are essential to model and understand the sonic layer depth. Fixed sensors remain valuable, but the Aleutian to Bering Strait geography has too many access points to cover effectively. Unmanned systems, supported by survey ships for manned presence and rapid analysis, would provide the flexibility and coverage necessary for sustained domain awareness. Naval intelligence would use the new data to provide assessments on the submarine threat.

Train with the Army and Marine Corps. The Army’s Arctic Strategy calls for an Arctic multidomain task force (MDTF) capable of antiaccess/area-denial operations in the High North. Naval intelligence should work with the MDTF to provide threat assessments, targeting data, and cueing against submarines by integrating data from national technical means, P-8 aircraft, and Navy acoustic, electronic, and signals intelligence capabilities. Naval intelligence also could lead the joint fires effort against undersea threats in coordination with Air Force and Space Force assets.

The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advanced base operations concept offers similar opportunities and could be adapted to include ASW missions. Blue-green integration would allow these expeditionary forces to operate effectively alongside MDTF elements, creating a persistent, joint presence in the Arctic maritime domain.

The Navy also should start hosting joint wargames dedicated to Arctic scenarios to refine policy, identify capability gaps, and assess existing regional assets. Naval intelligence should drive this effort, using the Naval War College as a venue and inviting warfare tactics instructors from other warfighting communities, alongside representatives from all services, to ensure realistic and cross-domain integration.

Designate an Arctic intelligence lead. The Arctic remains a significant operational gap for the Navy, and naval intelligence must take the lead in closing it. This requires both day-to-day operational intelligence production and Navy-wide policy and requirements coordination. The Chief of Naval Intelligence should establish with the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence an Arctic Maritime Intelligence Office (AMIO) to identify and advance Departments of War and Homeland Security intelligence priorities and develop an Arctic maritime intelligence strategy. The Office of Naval Intelligence would remain the principal long-term analysis center on Arctic maritime issues, while Arctic Command’s Joint Intelligence Center would continue to perform operational intelligence analysis.

By splitting the responsibilities in this manner, the structure would integrate operational and strategic perspectives. The Office of Naval Intelligence’s production capacity and operational reach would keep Arctic threat analysis embedded in fleet decision-making. At the same time, the AMIO’s authority over Arctic intelligence policy and requirements would ensure consistent prioritization, resourcing, and cross-domain integration, from space to seabed.

At present, there have been no confirmed PLAN submarines in the Bering Sea or Arctic Ocean. However, based on China’s Arctic policy and preference for asymmetric options, a deployment within the next five to ten years is likely. Routine PLAN submarine patrols could begin by 2035, ramping up from summer patrols in the years prior. China’s ability to beat projected timelines, seen in the rapid construction of the Tan Suo San Hao and the accelerated development of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, suggests a PLAN Arctic submarine presence could emerge far sooner than Western planners expect. In addition, Russia’s dependence on China is steadily growing, and its ability to resist Beijing’s requests is steadily eroding.

If the United States allows the Arctic to remain a blind spot, the region will not serve as a buffer but as an open door for adversaries. The issue is not whether China will test this vector, but whether the United States will have the capability and focus to counter it. Naval intelligence is the only DoD entity with the history, skills, expertise, and personnel prepared for this scenario. It must act immediately.

1. The Arctic for this essay is defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, which includes areas beyond the Arctic Ocean. See U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, as Amended: Alaska and Polar Regions (Washington, DC: 2020), http://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/ARPA_Alaska_and_Polar.pdf.

2. China State Oceanic Administration, “State Oceanic Administration Director: Moving from a Major Polar Country into a Polar Great Power,” 14 November 2014.

3. Her Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom, Adapting to Change: UK Policy Towards the Arctic (London, UK: 17 October 2013), http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/adapting-to-change-uk-policy-towards-the-arctic.

4. Matti Puranen and Sanna Kopra, “China’s Arctic Strategy—A Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6, no. 1 (2023): 239–53; and Heljar Havnes and Johan Martin Seland, “The Increasing Security Focus in China’s Arctic Policy,” The Arctic Institute, 16 July 2019.

5. Puranen and Kopra, “China’s Arctic Strategy.”

6. Andrea Ghiselli, Protecting China’s Interests Overseas: Securitization and Foreign Policy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021).

7. Puranen and Kopra, “China’s Arctic Strategy.”

8. Puranen and Kopra, “China’s Arctic Strategy”; Natalia Chabarovskaya, “Going Steady: China and Russia’s Economic Ties Are Deeper than Washington Thinks,” Center for European Policy Analysis, 16 June 2025; Andrei Dagaev, “The Arctic Is Testing the Limits of the Sino-Russian Partnership,” Carnegie Politika, 18 February 2025; and Xiao Tianliang, National Key Discipline Theory Works of National Defense University: The Science of Military Strategy (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2022), 163–66.

9. Puranen and Kopra, “China’s Arctic Strategy”; and F. Liu and D. Liu, “Arctic Security and China’s National Security Interests from the Perspective of the New ‘National Security Law,’” Zhongguo Ruankexue, no. 9 (2018): 8–14.

10. Mike Schuler, “China Delivers Arctic-Capable Research Vessel, Expanding Polar Presence,” gCaptain, 27 December 2024.

11. Malte Humpert, “Chinese-Russian Naval Patrol Skirts U.S. Territorial Waters Off Alaska Coast,” gCaptain, 7 October 2024; and Department of the Air Force, The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, July 2020).

12. Xiao Tianliang, The Science of Military Strategy, 155–67.

13. Department of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Army, 19 January 2021).

14. Jason E. Bruzdzinski, “Demystifying Shashoujian,” in Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th Party Congress, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 309–64.

15. U.S. Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: 22 July 2024).

16. CDR Steve Hulse, USCG, “Bases on the Aleutian Islands Would Project U.S. Power Across the Pacific,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 151, no. 1 (January 2025).

17. Department of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance.

18. Hulse, “Bases on the Aleutian Islands”; Schuler, “China Delivers Arctic-Capable Research Vessel, Expanding Polar Presence”; and Chris Panella, “Nuclear Power Aircraft Carriers Would Give China’s Growing Navy New Reach, and Researchers Say It’s Working on the Reactor to Power One,” Business Insider, 12 November 2024.

Lieutenant Commander Saungwon Ko, U.S. Navy

Lieutenant Commander Ko is the analysis and production department head at Sixth Fleet in Naples, Italy, and a student in the National Intelligence University’s Strategic Intelligence master’s program. He commissioned as a surface warfare officer and later transferred to the information warfare community. He has served on amphibious ships, amphibious squadron staffs, a minesweeper, and the U.S. Forces Korea J2 watchfloor.

Featured image: A Chinese submarine off the port of Qingdao during an international fleet review. GUANG NIU/POOL/AFP

Source: Proceedings, December 2025… by Lieutenant Commander Saungwon Ko, U.S. Navy