Task Force 38 sortied from LEYTE GULF on 1 July, 1945, one what proved to be the final war cruise of World War II. The enemy altered the aircraft grid system on this date and some time was to elapse before grids were available in sufficient quantity to break the system. Fortunately, the enemy employed almost no countermeasures against Task Force 38 up to the time the grid system was broken. In fact, the entire operation was one in which the contribution of the Radio Intelligence Units was primarily of negative information as the enemy husbanded his air force in anticipation of Blue landings on the main islands.

Interception prior to the first strike on TOKYO at dawn 10 July provided no information of tactical import. On the run-in the picket boat channel and radar circuits were covered as well as continuous search for pertinent aircraft activity.

All radio intercepts indicated that tactical surprise was achieved en the dawn strikes in the TOKYO plain. Blue strikes were airborne at 0400. Full alerts were set by the enemy at 0511 in the KANTO Sea Frontier, and at 0517 in the YOKOSUKA Naval District. Interception on the radio circuits indicated that the enemy had failed to anticipate the incoming strikes by radar. Only one enemy plane successfully reconnoitered the Task Force. This plane was heard on an army circuit, 6351J, and the report was intercepted in an army code. No other circuits with the force were noted during the day.

On 11 July Task Force 38 retired from the TOKYO area. One plane was noted searching for the Task Force on 6351J but failed in the mission.

On the 12th the Task Force fueled and started the run-in for strikes on Northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, scheduled for the morning of the 13th. However, the strikes on the 13th were postponed because of weather. Interception on both days revealed nothing of tactical import to the Task Force.

Strikes were launched at dawn on the 14th on Northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO. Tactical surprise was again indicated. No tactical enemy air activity was heard in coverage of all known circuits in the area and continuous search. One enemy plane was splashed within the radar perimeter of the force without radio reaction. Planes of Air Group 901 which were normally active in this area in anti-submarine patrol were inactive throughout the day.

The assault was continued on the 15th. Again the contribution of the radio intelligence units was of negative information.

The Force refueled on the 16th. Tactical activity from KYUSHU bases against OKINAWA was heard during the bay but again nothing of tactical import to the Task Force was intercepted. The force began its run to a position off TOKYO BAY upon the completion of the fueling operation.

At dawn on 17 July carrier strikes were launched against the TOKYO area. As usual, enemy reactions were belated, indicating that tactical surprise had been achieved. However, the weather necessitated a cancellation of the strikes. No activity on the air circuits was noted during the day, nor during the night bombardment of HITACHI.

The Task Force remained off TOKYO on the 18th and by 1130 the weather had improved sufficiently to launch the first strike. Late in the afternoon the force had some visual bogeys, and one of them may well have been the army plane which at 1744 reported itself as “over the target” on 6351J. No further air reaction, either patrol or attack, was noted.

The Task Force retired on the 19th and replenished on the 20th, 21st and 22nd of July. During this period little of importance was noted on air circuits. Unproductive searches were followed on 7200J on the 19th and again on the 22nd.

On 23 July the Task Force proceeded toward the launching position off SHIKOKU. During the evening an attack against Blue forces at OKINAWA was followed, but nothing of tactical importance to the Task Force was heard.

At dawn on 24 July the Task Force launched strikes against targets around the INLAND SEA. At 0930 two snoopers were splashed. grid was intercepted at 1505 in a message stating “enemy surface forces sighted”. The grid system was still unbroken and the position indicated in the grid could not be worked out. At 1651 An Army-plane on 6150J came up with a very loud signal. Soon thereafter he was ordered by base to “attack according to plan”. Within a short time a plane was plashed close to the force by the CAP. Another search plane on 6755J reported that he had been unable to locate the “enemy”.

Enemy search planes were up on 3421J prior to dawn on the 25th, but absence of grid despatches indicated negative results. Strikes were sent for the second successive day over INLAND SEA targets. In mid-afternoon seven planes with loud signals were heard on 7200J. One sighted the force at 1457. At 1743 one of these planes sent a grid position on T. F. 38. At 1900 radar picked up many bogeys and two planes were splashed by one of the DD pickets. The attack signal was heard at 1929 and at 1936. A grid was copied at 1947. A total of seven planes were splashed during the attack.

Planes were up on search missions on 3320J prior to dawn on the 26th, but failed to locate the Task Force. Activity on KYUSHU circuits indicated that an attack on OKINAWA was in progress. Search planes reappeared on 7200J during the day. One plane spotted Blue surface forces at 1410 which were believed to be the light bombardment group to the north of T. F. 38’s position. No tactical activity developed from the sighting.

27 July again found the Task Force unlocated by the enemy. One plane was up on 6351J during the morning and several were up on 6640J during the afternoon but none contacted the force.

On 28 July the force launched carrier plane strikes against INLAND SEA-KYUSHU targets. Prior to the launch, planes were followed on 6155J as the staged an attack against OKINAWA targets. Air opposition to Blue attacks were negligible. Searches were conducted by planes on 6842J with negative results during the morning. A second search effort on this same channel occurred during the afternoon without success. TWO planes were out in searches, but neither reported the location of the force, although one made a futile attempt to inform base that he was in contact with “enemy planes” just before he was splashed.

On 29 July the force had moved off TOKYO for the bombardment of HAMMAMATSU after nightfall. Radio interception again indicated that the enemy had declined to strike back.

Strikes were launched against the NAGOYA-TOKYO area on the 30th. Again the enemy alerts were belated, indicating that tactical surprise had been achieved. An army plane was heard on 6351J. Base requested the “position of the enemy” and received a bearing and distance report indicating that the Force was located. In the late afternoon planes were heard on 7200J, but failed to close.

The Force retired on the 31st to the fueling area. Little enemy air activity was noted other than one plane on 6351J on what may have been a search mission. Nothing of tactical import to the Force was noted during the remainder of the day.

During 1 August the Task Force replenished and then spent the second and the third of the month maneuvering out of the path of a typhoon. Receiving conditions were extremely poor during the storm.

On 4 August the Task Force again approached the EMPIRE. Again the radio intelligence contribution was one of negative information.

The strikes scheduled for 5 August against the SASEBO area were cancelled to give the Army a clear field for the atomic bombing mission against NAGASAKI. No enemy tactical air missions were noted during the day.

The Force replenished on 6 August. Again no enemy tactical air activity was heard.

The 7th found the Task Force enroute to a launching position off Northern HONSHU. Again nothing of tactical import could be heard.

The strikes scheduled for 8 August were cancelled due to heavy weather which effectively screened the Task Force. Two enemy planes were splashed by the CAP without any radio reaction heard.

On 9 August the force launched strikes against airfields on Northern HONSHU. At 1148 7220J became active with one search plane airborne. At 1158 this plane sent the signal meaning “enemy surface forces sighted”, and at 1205 he elaborated by saying that carriers had been sighted and sent the position.

Disposition and weather messages were originated by the plane at 1225 and 1245. The plane was splashed at 1248 by the CAP. At 1420 attack planes were heard airborne on this circuit. Six planes were in communication. One at 1431 reported that he was returning to base because of engine trouble. Another reported that he was making a forced landing at 1505. At 1515 a radar Picket destroyer “shot down two Graces and was crashed by a third”. At 1541 only one plane was still in communication. He sighted the Task Force at 1603 and was splashed by the CAP after getting off only one transmission of a weather report at 1606. At 1635 a new plane came up on this channel. He sighted the force at 1840 and immediately began his return to base. Two planes were reported shot down during the day at other tires and were unaccounted for in radio interception.

On 10 August the strikes against Northern HONSHU airfields were continued. Neutralization strikes hit KISARAZU Air Base from which the enemy planes had been operating on 7200J. The light activity noted on this circuit during the day was evaluated as deception. No tactical air activity developed during the day. The radio intelligence unit with Commander second Carrier Task Force copied the Domei despatch which gave the first intimation that surrender negotiations were under way.

The Force fueled on 11 August. Interception revealed no tactical air activity by the enemy.

The Force maneuvered on the 12th to avoid a bad storm. Again the radio intelligence contribution was one of negative information.

On the 13th T. F. 38 launched strikes on airfields and industrial targets in the TOKYO area as the Japanese continued their efforts to make a final decision on surrender. 7200J became active early in the morning as the enemy Naval Air Force continued to wage war. A reconnaissance plane was splashed at 0520 in the morning. At 0758 a second plane on this circuit closed the force and sent a grid position on a carrier group and then returned to base. A plane was shot down during the morning without radio reaction. At 1135 two new planes appeared on the circuit, one of which returned to base because of engine trouble. A total of five planes were called by the base on this circuit but none answered. At 1309 a new plane came up on the circuit and sent a grid report on the carrier force at 1349, and at 1510 a message was sent by the base to planes which refused to receipt for it. -kit 1645 twenty-four enemy planes were located by the CAP and eleven splashed. No further activity was heard on 7200) although bogies were reported by the radar picket until 1930.

The force fueled on 14 August. Little enemy air activity was noted of import to T. F. 38, although intercepts indicated search activity was indicated in the Russian zone of operations.

On the morning of 15 August carrier planes were launched against TOKYO but were ordered to return before they reached the target. The offensive by T. F. 38 was at an end but defensive dispositions were maintained. At noon the Japanese Emperor addressed his EMPIRE in an Imperial Rescript which made the surrender official. Several enemy planes were splashed during the afternoon. Presumably these had been ordered out prior to 1200. Searches had been out during the morning and had made contact with the Task Force using 7200J for communications.

The Task Force refueled on the 16th. Two “enemy” planes were up on 7200J during the morning. A sighting was made at 1205 and was followed at 1225 by a weather message. No offensive action followed. Some plain language was cooled during the day.

Two search planes were watched closely on 7200J on the 17th. They failed to close the force. From this date forward, radio intelligence afloat made little or no contribution. For all practical purposes its contribution to Fleet operations was at an end.

Language Officers and assigned ship:

Com3rdFleet – Comdr. G. M. Slonim (in USS MISSOURI)
COMTASKFOR 38 – Lt. E. B. Beath (in USS SHANGRI-LA)
COMTASKGRP 38.1 – Lt.(jg) F. 0. Miller (in USS BENNINGTON)
COMTASKGRP 38.3 – Lt.(jg) R. A. Wilson (in USS RANDOLPH)
COMTASKGRP 38.4 – Lt. W. W. Burd (in USS YORKTOWN)
Lt.(jg) D. A. Anderson, Assistant to Comdr.Slonim
Lt.(jg) A. D. Sabetta, Assistant to Lt. Beath

Officers aboard for training cruise:

Lt.(jg) E. M. Coffin with Lieut. Miller
Lt.(jg) S. E. Yoas with Lieut. Wilson
Lt.(jg) A. B. Ragan with Lieut. Burd

*After the surrender, Lt. Col. B. T. Holcomb went out with Com5tbFleet aboard USS NEW JERSEY.