UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
RADIO UNIT
COMMANDANT, NAVY 128
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

MEMORANDUM 22 March 1944.

To: Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).

Subj: Weekly News Memorandum – Week Ending 19 March 1944 (Excerpts from).

I – ADMINISTRATION

10. (CONFIDENTIAL) Model TDH Transmitter, Serial No. 23, has been installed at Lualualei. Its commissioning has been delayed by the fact that EIMAC 750 TL tubes received with it were found to be defective. Replacement tubes have been obtained and the transmitter is expected to go on the air about 22 March.

II – OPERATION AND PLANNING

(A) 20- G-1 Items

11. (SECRET) There follows a discussion of Marine Radio Intelligence Platoons and plans for their use and is the gist of a memorandum prepared by “GX”.

The original plan for use of the Radio Intelligence Platoons is not fully known here, but from conversation with the officer personnel of these platoons and observation of various bits of information, official and unofficial, it is believed that the Navy Department is not entirely cognizant of the present state of affairs. The remarks that follow are offered as informative only.

Organization: Sometime ago the Marine Corps Headquarters apparently gathered in a few of the former Kana operators who had copied Japanese diplomatic and Navy traffic for the Navy at Shanghai and Peking. As far as is known, Captain LESKO is the senior among three to five old timers and appears to be in charge of the two platoons now operating the general Solomon’s Area. Two other former Kana operators Lieut. PETROSEY and Lieut. CARAWAY are in charge of the two platoons now at Wahiawa. The interceptor operators of all these platoons were trained at the Bainbridge school, among other places, during the last, year or two and are all relatively high grade operators since they were expert radiomen before their selection for Kana training. The other personnel in the platoons, consisting of the direction finder operating complement and the wire sections, were not necessarily radiomen prior to assignment and consequently are not in a class with the intercept operators. Also attached to each platoon is a Marine Corps Japanese Language Officer recently graduated from the Colorado Language School. The foregoing is enough to give an idea of personnel of the platoon. There are about forty enlisted personnel in each platoon, fifteen of whom are expert Kana operators.


Equipment: The equipment furnished these units is primarily radio receiving equipment and direction finders all fitted in trailers. The platoon is self-sustained, having everything necessary for its operation including power supply, messing and living facilities and so forth.

A survey of the personnel and materiel of these platoons, together with remarks made by one of the platoon leaders, would lead one to believe that the Marine Corps Headquarters intended them to obtain all possible, radio bearings and intercept of the enemy in the advanced areas and based on their knowledge and experience, to make intelligence reports to the commander of the forces in that area. OPNAV apparently approved and encouraged this project on some such assumption. At least, the Department approved the training of the Kana operators at Bainbridge and issued to the officer in charge of each platoon one very valuable text book which they would take with them into the combat area; the present effective volume of “JN Recognition Data” was shown to one of the officers in charge of a platoon who stated that he held the same thing. This book contains extremely detailed data on Japanese cryptographic systems which when analyzed carefully gives but one impressions that of our complete decryption knowledge of vital enemy systems. This one book and such things as maps and charts comprise the principal documents carried by the platoon.

Activity of RI Platoons – Past and Present: The first platoon to reach Wahiawa was organized in United States in 1943 and arrived in the Hawaiian Area in November of 1943. In the three or four months between this date and their assignment at Wahiawa the personnel either performed guard duty or stood security watch on local circuits. They were also engaged in copying Japanese traffic for training purposes. When they arrived at Wahiawa, the more experienced operators were found well-qualified to go on an enemy circuit immediately. The other men who were supposed to be direction finder operators were not qualified for this duty because of their lack of Kana training and were immediately put in school. The assignment of the platoons to profitable endeavor increased their morale tremendously. Their enthusiasm is high and the intercept operators are excellent. Those in school are making very excellent progress. At the present time the platoon commanders and language officers are receiving instruction in “GT”, attempting to their anticipated duties in a two months’ period.

Recently COMSOPAC forwarded a letter originated by Captain LESKO which contained some very valuable intelligence information on the Rabaul-Solomons Area. This letter indicated that the platoons in that area were performing their normal function as far as radio interception is concerned; that their analysis of enemy radio circuits was sound as far as it went, but also indicated that there was no further attempt at analysis or utilization of that information in the chain of command between Captain LESKO and FRUPAC. It is indicated that there are no Marine officers trained in the evaluation of radio intelligence obtained by this means, and this duty probably will have to fall upon the Officer in Charge of the platoon.

Qualifications of USMC Personnel in RI Platoons for Intended Operations

As stated before, the intercept operators in the RI platoons are considered excellent and other enlisted personnel are learning rapidly. Each platoon is made up of approximately forty raw material intercept operators, but has only two analysts, the officer in charge and the language officer. The organization of the platoons to obtain the intercept and bearings is considered sound; but as for analyzing the intercepts, bearings and collateral information, the platoon is not self-sustaining nor is it prepared or qualified to extract very much information from the intercepts. The proportion of analysts to operators [are] to small, and the qualifications of the analysts at the present date, leave much experience and training to be desired. This problem could probably be partially remedied by selecting one or two petty officers from the operators’ branch for training as analysts.

Another item of importance that arises in the training of these analysts is the lack of Japanese Army radio traffic, which is not copied by FRUPAC. Such being the case, the present instruction and training at Wahiawa and FRUPAC is centered entirely around Japanese Naval Communications for the reason that Army traffic is not now available. While this will be very beneficial for the operators in general, more effort appears to be required to obtain Army traffic and data.

Plans for Use of Radio Intelligence Platoons: At the present time we have no definite future plans for the use of the radio intelligence, platoons here, except an unofficial discussion with the Commander of the 5th Amphibious Staff, that when training has been completed it would be a good idea to send them out in the field for further training.

Tentatively, we consider Station AO would be a good place for this training.

Consideration should be given to the following:

Assist the Marine Corps in determination of the policy and mission of the radio intelligence platoons.

Review the matter of publications issued to Marine radio intelligence platoons in view of the danger of compromise or loss.

Continue the pretraining of platoons here at Hypo and send them to advance intercept stations with the approval Commander 5th Amphibious Force. This matter will be taken care of locally.

Please note that the above remarks are informative only and are merely, to outline very briefly the present situation.

The following is a training schedule, drawn up by “GX”, for a two months’ course. While this will not make skillful analysts out of the students, it will at least put them in a position to do a far better job where they are called upon to do it.

1. The following schedule is based on a two months training period and these assumptions:

(a) RI Platoon will operate in an advanced base remote from any Combat intelligence Center.

(b) RI Platoon Analysts consist of two officers, one 0-in-C and one officer translator.

(c) Available communication facilities permit OinC RI Platoon to make periodic written intelligence reports-perhaps twice a week or daily.

(d) Briefly, the RI Platoon and the two officers will be “on their own” with no regular assistance at hand and will make intelligence reports based entirely on the intercepts from their own radiomen.

2. First week – Using RIP44 and current traffic as references:

(a) Learn the parts of the despatch with particular emphasis on all signals preceding the TI.

(b) Know thoroughly the broadcast system, locutions or main broadcast stations, and the system of designators.

(c) Study the Kana sequences (A, E, HA, etc. and A KA SA TA series).

(d) Learn the use of the ika and other simple routing instructions.

(e) Study available maps and preferably captured enemy charts of area most interested in.

3. Third week.

(a) Study types of crypto systems using the text and any one day’s traffic (from A0, Guadalcanal, or H) and learn to identify systems.

(b) Obtain frequency data on circuits in most interested area from GE. With this data, draw communication schematic diagram showing all channels in and out of area.

(c) Study current call lists, (OTSU, KO, and HEI) and garble tables. Using current traffic decode headings of at least 10 despatches.

4. Fourth week.

(a) Study all available captured documents in GX particularly those in frequency section and call lists in GT.

(b) Study Japanese Navy Organization ashore and afloat.

(c) From captured documents showing Japanese Army communications, call lists, etc. learn differences in Navy and Army procedure, types of traffic, etc.

5. Fifth week.

(a) Take any one day’s traffic from USMC. Guadalcanal station and analyze every despatch and signal. Make a written analysis without resorting to texts, call lists of any kind.

(b) After (a) above, make an additional written analysis of same day’s traffic with the aid of call lists, etc.

(c) If time permits, repeat (a) above.

6. Sixth week – Seventh week.

(a) Go on regular watch with one group of analysts in GT assigned to most interested area. Study methods of analysis and actually do some of the work.

7. Eighth week – Ninth week.

(a) Analyze carefully the Guadalcanal or AO traffic, make written intelligence reports using all available aids.

14. (SECRET) An incomplete check of dispatches intercept

AO between 10 and 15 March has been made. Data submitted to that AO will get about what was expected: complete and accurate copy of the Truk, Palao, and Saipan local circuits an a great deal of intermediate and low frequency channels not now copied at Hypo. Further developments will be reported as info is available.

19. The originator hereby certifies that this is impracticable to phrase this document in a manner which will permit a classification other than SECRET. Due to the urgency of this document, its transmission by registered air mail to the addressee is authorized.

/s/ W. B. Goggins
     W. B. GOGGINS
  Captain, U. S. Navy

cc: Station Baker