This message was received in the State Department at 9:19 a.m., on December 4, 1941 (Washington time). Copies were forwarded to the War and Navy Departments by the State Department Liaison Officer, Mr. Orme Wilson. They were given a wide circulation in the Navy Department.
My own evaluation of the foregoing, on December 4, 1941, was about as follows:
(A) The Basic Japanese War Plan was divided into 3 categories or provided for 3 contingencies, any or all of which might be followed, namely:
(1) War with the United States
(2) War with Russia
(3) War with England including the invasion of Thailand and the capture of Malaya and the Duth East Indies.
(B) The Winds Message gave us the answer in all 3 cases: Affirmative for the 1st and 3rd categories, and Negative for the 2nd.
(C) The Winds Message was probably a “Signal of Execute” of some sort
The “Signal of Execute” theory received strong confirmation from a secret message received from the Philippines in the early afternoon of December 4, 1941. This message informed us that the Japanese Navy had introduced a new cipher system for its so-called “Operations Code” at 0600 GCT that date. This time was 7 1/2 hours before the Winds Message was broadcast. I might add that there was only one J-A-P European broadcast per day, so the times coincided as closely as possible. I would like to add
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also that my subordinates on Corregidor spotted and reported this change only nine hours after it was made. The message may be identified as Commandant 16th Naval District Priority 041502 dated December 4, 1941, and was addressed to Naval Operations and the Commandant 14th Naval District but not to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. So far as I know, this message has not been introduced as evidence before any previous investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. In fact, this is the first time it has ever been mentioned except to Admiral Hart. The unusual hour and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its “Operations Code,” combined with the Winds Message and other collateral information available in the Navy Department, made this message highly significant as the probable “Signal of Execute” to the Japanese Navy. Up till now the Winds Message has had to bear a double burden in my testimony.
As I have previously testified, we expected that if the Japanese did suddenly attack the United States this attack would come on a week-end or national holiday. In fact, a warning message to this effect had been sent out in April, 1941 (page 1 of Exhibit No. 37). The War Department over-emphasized the imminence of War as forecast by the “November 29, deadline” and predicted that the Japanese would strike during the week-end of November 29-30, 1941. The Navy Department estimated the situation more accurately — the Japanese armada which had been concentrating for the Southern invasion was too far from any conceivable objective to give serious consideration to this date. Also the covering Naval forces were not yet deployed and other signs indicated that the U.S. Army estimate was a bit premature.
–21–
The next week-end, December 6-7, 1941, was just the reverse. The Winds Message and the change of the Naval Operations Code came in the middle of the week: 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday. It was unthinkable that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by delaying until the week-end of December 13-14, 1941. This was not crystal gazing or “intuition” — it was just the plain, common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposition. Colonel Sadtler saw it, and so did Captain Joseph R. Redman, U.S.N. — according to Colonel Sadtler’s testimony in 1944, before the Army Board of Investigation. The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941. The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours’ advance notification of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese themselves.
— FINISH —
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Notes: Although Captain Safford is highly regarded as the “father” of US Navy communications intelligence, his statement is extremely controversial and does not represent the opinion of the Naval History and Heritage Command.
For further information on the “Winds” code messages, see: Dept. of Defense. The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor. vol.5. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978): pp.51-54, “Part D-Special Studies, The ‘Winds’ Code.” The text accompanying “Part-D” includes the following remarks: “It will be apparent from the foregoing that American intelligence agencies throughout the world were maintaining a constant watch in order to intercept a ‘Winds’ code message which would indicate that Japan was breaking off relations with the United States. However, the Federal Communications Commission has no record of intercepting a message other than those mentioned above which indicate, after the attack on Pearl Harbor had already begun, that Japan would break off relations with England. Furthermore, there is no document in American Communication Intelligence files which indicates receipt of any ‘Winds’ code message announcing the severance of relations between Japan and the United States. The preliminary ‘Winds’ code messages pointed only to the breaking of relations with Great Britain, Russia, or the United States, and gave no hint as to the possibility of an attack upon Pearl Harbor. In the light of all other evidence available concerning Japan’s intentions to go to war, it is apparent that even if the ‘Winds’ messages had never existed, United States’ authorities would have been just as well informed of Japan’s intentions to go to war.“
[END]
Station HYPO 
27 August 2022 at 15:20
Quite another interesting bit of history. Thank you, Mario, for this article.
Jim King
CTOC Ret.
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24 September 2022 at 17:55
Over the years far too many Pearl Harbor writers placed far too much emphasis on the importance of the winds execute. Writers made it appear that had the United States intercepted a winds execute message, Higashi No Kaze Ame, or East Wind, Rain in English, it would have been sufficient proof that Japan was about to embark upon war with the United States.
It appears to this writer that the primary source most Pearl Harbor writers used in reaching their conclusions is a document titled REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. This is a United States Government document published in 1946 by the 79th Congress.
As originally published there are at least two versions of the JCC’s REPORT. One version contains only the JCC’s majority report. The second version known to this writer contains both the majority and minority reports in a single, paperback bound edition.
In May 1994, the Aegean Park Press produced their own version of the JCC’s report. This document is titled: INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK – REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.. On page ii of the Aegean Park Press version it states: “This book is a copy, without changes, of the Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack….” This statement is misleading. The Aegean Park Press reprint does not include the minority report signed by Senators Homer Ferguson and Owen Brewster. (The original document containing both majority and minority findings is 580 pages in length. The majority report including the “Additional Views of Mr. [Frank B.] Keefe covers pages 1 thru 492, The minority report covers pages 493 to 580.)
The JCC’s majority report provides readers with twenty-five conclusions. Over the years since 1946, these 25 conclusions became the basis for the conclusions given by the vast majority of Pearl Harbor writers.
Page 266-U of the JCC’s majority report contains a statement by President Harry S Truman. Truman concluded his statement: “I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.” These are nuanced words!
In 1941, President Truman’s nephew, then Captain Louis W. Truman, was General Short’s aide.
Exhibits 1 and 2 of the Joint Congressional Committee are Japanese diplomatic and consular messages. These documents are what the public has long known as Magic intercepts. (See PHA12, pp. 1-253 for Exhibit 1; and pp. 254-316 for Exhibit 2.) Any person taking the time to read all the “Magic” intercepts published in these two exhibits would realize it was evident that Japan was on the verge of making war against the United States.
Japanese ambassador to Berlin’s telegram #1393 of 29 November 1941 reports on the ambassador’s conversation with the German foreign minister. The foreign minister tells the ambassador: “Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer [sic] is determined on that point.”
An earlier intercept from Tokyo to Washington advised Ambassador Nomura of a “deadline” in coming to a diplomatic agreement with the United States, after which things are “automatically going to happen.” (Tokyo to Washington telegram #812, 22 November 1941, PHA12, p. 165.)
An intercept of a message from Budapest to Tokyo of 7 December 1941 reads: “On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.” While average readers may need to have the implications of this message described to them, I’m certain Station Hypo’s readers will understand its implications. (See exhibit 1, PHA12, p. 252.)
Did the U.S. intelligence apparatus fail to alert the Hawaiian commanders that Japan was about to go to war with the United States?
In late November 1941 General Short and Admiral Kimmel received instructions from Washington. The essential element in these two messages reads: “THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT.”
Evidence indicates this instruction was given by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Evidence further indicates these “war warning messages” were read and approved by President Roosevelt prior to transmission to the Hawaiian Commanders.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill long ago expressed his feelings about Pearl Harbor: “No American will think it wrong of me that to proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured accurately the martial might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war, up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!”
This is what “Pearl Harbor” did not just for Britain but for all of humanity.
Andrew “Andy” McKane
P.O. Box 166
Maunaloa (Molokai) Hawaii 96770
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