Commander Welker or I sent TWX messages directing the intercept stations at Bainbridge Island (Washington) and at Cheltenham (Maryland) to monitor the schedules given in Tokyo Serial 843 as first priority and to forward all plain-language Japanese intercepts on these schedules to the Navy Department by teletype.
We may have sent these instructions to other stations also. We did not want English or coded messages–only written Japanese. We gave the same instructions to both stations, and sent them out immediately after releasing the previously-mentioned OPNAV 282301.
I have confirmation of the above orders plus knowledge of existing receiving conditions in the monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, extracts from which are quoted below:
Station “M” (Cheltenham) — Operations — November 1941
Receiving conditions throughout the month were very good on all frequencies. Atmospheric disturbances have been at a minimum. Orders received from OP-20-GX at 2315 (GCT) November 28, via teletype to give highest priority to various broadcasts at designated Japanese broadcast stations. These schedules were covered and found to be press broadcasts sent in both Kana and English. Log sheets were forwarded to OP-20-GX daily with regular traffic files.
Station “M” (Cheltenham) — Operations — December 1941
Receiving conditions during the month were fair to good on all frequencies. At 2300, 7 December 1941, telephone orders received from OP-20-GX to drop the Tokyo JJC/MAM schedules and assignments; continued watch for Orange activity.
Station “W” (Winter Harbor) — Operations — December 1941
Receiving Conditions in General. Daily attempts were made to intercept Tokyo and Osaka channels employed to Europe, but only on a few occasions was any intercept possible.
Station “S” (Bainbridge Island) — Operations — November 1941
During the month of November a sharp increase has been noticed in the amount of message traffic sent on the Kana General Information Broadcasts. Where before we seldom averaged more than one or two such messages monthly, it is now not unusual for two or three such messages to appear daily. These messages are sent in both number code and Kana.
On 28 November, a directive was received by TWX from Op-20-GX which called for coverage of the following stations at times specified, with priority transmission of intercepted material by TWX. Times listed were given as PST. Because the use of PST time designation is unusual, we asked for a verification, but were told that time zone was uncertain and verification was not possible.
PST (GCT) STATION FREQUENCY
0100 (0900) JVJ 12275
0130 (0930) JUO 9430
0200 (1000) JVJ 2275
0300 (1100) JHL 5160
0400 (1200) JHL 5160
0500 (1300) JHL 5160
0530 (1330) JHP 11980
Since the time zone indicated was not certain we were faced with the possibility that the time could be either GCT, PST, zone -9, or even a combination of these. As soon as the directive was received we started copying all broadcasts of this same type which were readable at “S”. We found that in some cases other stations were tied in with the Stations listed in the original directive, and that although we could not copy the station listed we could copy the cornetted channel carrying the same broadcast. The stations and time that we can copy are listed below. Time used is GCT.
GCT STATION FREQUENCY CORNETTED WITH
0000 JVJ 12275 JUP
0030 JUD 15880 JVJ/JAU2
0100 JUD 15880 JVJ
0130 JVJ 12275
0200 JVJ 12275
0230 JVJ 12275 JUP/JUD
0300 JVJ 12275 JUD
0330 JVJ 12275 JUD
0400 JVJ 12275
0430 JVJ 12275
0500 JVJ 12275 JUD
1300 JHL 5160
2200 JVJ 12275
2300 JVJ 12275
2330 JVJ 12275
At my instructions, or at least with my concurrence, Commander Welker consulted with his opposite number in the War Department, Captain Schukraft, and ascertained that the Army was monitoring for the Winds Message at San Francisco, and possibly elsewhere, but was not monitoring for the Winds Messages anywhere on the East Coast of the United States. I do not know what sort of instructions the Army gave its intercept stations. I do not know why the Army failed to monitor for the Winds Message on the East Coast of the United States: Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Schukraft may remember. I believe that the above-mentioned conference was held before we issued instruction to our own intercept stations.
The F.C.C. was requested by the War Department to monitor for the Winds Message on the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts and was given the code words of Tokyo Circular 2353 but without their meaning. The F.C.C. was not furnished the Tokyo Broadcast Schedules nor any mention of the fact that the Winds Message could come by Morse code. The F.C.C. was requested to monitor the Winds Message at its monitor station at Portland, Oregon, and also at one of its monitoring stations on the East Coast of the United States. The latter request was not complied with because the F.C.C. doubted if voice broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard on the East Coast of the United States. The F.C.C. monitor station at Honolulu also monitored for the Winds Message, at the request of the local military authorities. The F.C.C. monitor station at Portland, Oregon, could not possibly have intercepted the same Winds Message that Cheltenham did because Cheltenham was monitoring for Morse code, exclusively, and the F.C.C. station at Portland was monitoring for voice, exclusively.
In addition to the stations previously named, the Winds Message was monitored for at the following localities, to my personal knowledge:
Heeia, T.H. (U.S. Navy) Voice only
Corregidor, P.I. (U.S. Navy) Voice and Morse
Singapore (British Intelligence) -?-
Australia (Australian Intelligence) -?-
Java (NEI Intelligence) -?-