On this date 54 years ago the USS Pueblo was captured by North Korea.
When North Korea captured a U.S. Navy electronic surveillance ship, the USS Pueblo, in international waters in 1968, it was perhaps the worst security breach in U.S. history. One of the potential responses to North Korean aggression, drafted and approved by top military officials, was nuclear war.
The USS Pueblo was positioned in international waters (this is disputed by North Korea, of course) in January of 1968, using electronic means to intercept North Korean signals and messages. On January 23rd, North Korean ships opened fire on the Pueblo, which tried and failed to flee. The captain surrendered, and both the crew and ship were captured.
That the crew were held (and tortured) for a year was bad enough, but the ship held an enormous amount of U.S. intelligence data. Worst of all, it held several devices used to decode encrypted U.S. military messages. Much later, the Navy would learn that the loss of the devices was compounded by the fact that the infamous Walker Spy ring was at the time already selling codes and other information to the Soviets.
The result of all this was a tense period during which the U.S. tried to figure out what the North Koreans were up to, the extent to which the U.S.S.R. and China were involved, and whether North Korea was planning an invasion of South Korea. During this same period, North Korean commandos were crossing the DMZ to attack targets in the south, including an attempted attack on the South Korean president’s house. It wasn’t quite Cuban Missile Crisis tense, but there were some white knuckles in the war room to be sure.
Diplomacy won out, with the U.S. basically waiting out the crisis until the Koreans released the prisoners, with some diplomatic help from the Soviets. Military aid to South Korea was increased, and the practice of leaving spy ships unarmed and alone while monitoring potentially hostile targets was brought into question. Today the USS Pueblo is a floating museum in Pyongyang – they gave back the crew but not the ship.
Recently declassified documents reveal the U.S.’s contingency plans, both for dealing with the capture of the Pueblo and for responding to a hypothetical North Korean invasion. The military’s view of the situation was somewhat less diplomatic (which is their job, after all). They wanted to send a bunch of ships to Wŏnsan to flex their muscles and intimidate the North Koreans, but U.S. forces were a bit preoccupied in 1968, what with the Vietnam War and all. No ships were sent.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff then considered invading North Korea, bombing the living hell out of them with B-52s until their air force was simply nonexistent. Then the land troops would move in. Analysis showed that China and the U.S.S.R. were very likely to intervene in some way. The plan accounted for this. However, this plan would have required the U.S. to pull out of Vietnam almost entirely (it required 12 divisions of troops and 40 tactical bomber squadrons). In all they developed five military plans to deal with the situation, varying in timing and specific troop disposition. These plans were called Fresh Storm.
Then there was the nuclear plan, called Freedom Drop. It was developed by CINCPAC, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, who at the time was Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp (Sharp was succeeded later in 1968 by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., father of Senator John McCain). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan, so the potential responses included all-out nuclear war against tactical military targets – the Joint Chiefs delayed informing Sharp of the approval, however.
The warheads in such a situation would be delivered by Honest John rockets and Sergeant missiles, each with a maximum yield of 70 kilotons (very roughly five times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb). It would not have been a happy ending for anyone on the Korean peninsula.
You can see the documents themselves at the National Security Archive, hosted by George Washington University: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/
By Ed Grabianowski
23 January 2022 at 12:52
I have not yet had time to fully review this article but as one closely involved with the aftermath of the USS Pueblo capture response by USAF and Air Forces Korea I can confirm that 5th Air Force and 314 Air Division were totally unprepared to respond to its capture. In fact the main topic of the Command 314 AD briefing the morning before its capture was about building a golf course on Osan AFB. More details about the Air Force response are contained in the now declassified CHECO Report which can be found at: https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA586301
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23 January 2022 at 14:47
I arrived in Kamiseya, Japan that fateful day and saw tons of activity over the next few weeks, I can tell you we were very close to war. A few months later you will recall N. Korea shot down our EC-121 with all aboard being lost and I believe only 1 body was found. We had lots of chatter from all over during those tense times. Thanks for the memories and so sad we lost some good people in both incidences.
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23 January 2022 at 14:48
The last post from from Tom Hyde, former R brancher Kamiseya and later RVN.
23 January 2022 at 17:59
This R brancher arrived at Hakata, Japan a few weeks after the Pueblo “incident”. While the NavSecGru Activity existed there, we were on three section watch. Additional attention had to be found to give more time to KorCom naval activity. We did it. Sometimes actions are not taken causing reactions to occur instead. History has recorded other incidents such as this and they are now footnotes in history.
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