So how are we doing?
From: Branch, Ted N VADM OPNAV, N2N6
Sent: Friday, January 08, 2016 11:16 AM
Subject: Information Warfare
Information Warfare Community Leaders,
CNO cemented his commanders’ intent this week through the publication of his “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” On Wednesday, during his All-Hands Call with N2N6 the CNO stressed the importance of Information Warfare and said he was “double dog doubling down” on Information Warfare. The message is crystal clear.
CNO’s emphasis on information IN warfare and information AS warfare, and the fact that our contribution is critical for our Navy’s success, is great for our community. We need to stay aligned with CNO’s messaging and consistent in our terminology. We had already begun the task of rationalizing our language with the existing doctrine and, where necessary, making revisions. From this day forward, throughout the Navy we’ll replace the term “Information Dominance” with “Information Warfare.” Additionally, we are no longer a “Corps.” We are now a “Community,” the Information Warfare Community. This aligns with Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, Undersea Warfare, etc., and furthers our efforts to mainstream information warfare as one of four predominate warfare areas.
Bruce Loveless, in coordination with your teams, will develop a robust a plan to accomplish the many actions required to reflect this change. In parallel, VADM Tighe is working on a name change for the 1810 designator.
Over the next few months, we have a number of engagements scheduled to include an IW Flag Panel, Fleet Concentration Town Halls (Norfolk/San Diego), AFCEA WEST 2016, IW Senior Leader Symposium, and Navy League Sea-Air-Space, where we will highlight this important change in name and priority.
Looking for your support in getting the word out.
Ted “Twig” Branch
9 January 2018 at 20:59
As an outside but interested observer not privy to classified information, I offer the following with regard to how are you, the Information Warfare Community doing.
First and foremost, “How we are doing” has to be assessed against what appears to be a still non-existent, formal, published definition of Navy Information Warfare and its mission.
Second, assuming that Navy Information Warfare is a serious initiative to man, structure, train, and equip the fleet with offensive and defensive information related operations that are critical to US Navy combat success, the following fundamentals are offered as a basis for measuring progress — or lack thereof.
Warfare refers to the common activities and characteristics of types of war, such as the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare, and characteristics such as the offense and the defense.
With respect to information in warfare, the objective of the offense is to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp decision making by an adversary, e.g. keep the enemy from getting or using accurate information. The offense would include:
Activities to influence or deceive enemy intelligence analyses and slow or mislead decision
Activities such as emission control to deny enemy sensors the observables required to
detect, locate, track, classify, identify, or understand US or allied operations.
Activities to destroy, deceive, disrupt, or corrupt enemy surveillance, reconnaissance, target
acquisition and target seeking sensor systems.
The objective of the defense is to prevent the enemy from influencing, disrupting, corrupting or usurping US and allied decision making, e.g. defend us from enemy efforts to keep us from getting or using accurate information. The defense would include:
Defense against enemy activities to influence or deceive intelligence analyses and slow or
mislead US and allied decision makers.
Defense against activities to disrupt, corrupt, or destroy US and allied intelligence, command
and control, and supporting communications.
Defense against enemy activities to destroy, deceive, disrupt, or corrupt US and allied
surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition and target seeking sensor systems.
If some or all of the objectives of the offense and defense are valid, the assessment could proceed to more concrete metrics associated with structuring, manning, training, and equipping the force.
Information Threat /Opportunity (Has the US Navy done the analysis to identify the
adversary information or information dependent systems and activities are the highest threat
to or potential advantage for the US Navy?)
(Recent reports on Russian and Chinese ballistic and hypervelocity anti-ship missiles and the
threat they pose to surface navy operations suggest a strategy would be to counter
Russian/Chinese ISR and target acquisition information capabilities required to complete the
anti-ship missile kill chain.)
(Recent reports of Russian operations associated with undersea cables suggests a serious
threat of potential disruption of major communications networks associated with intelligence
and military operations.)
(Adversaries have had decades to study US ISR and intelligence operations, their
importance to successful operations, and their vulnerabilities. Have US vulnerabilities been
assessed and offset with improved or new capabilities?)
If the Navy has identified the highest priority information threats/opportunities, has it performed the analysis of technical and non-technical alternatives to address the threat or exploit the opportunity?
Are the alternatives that offer the most cost/effective promise in the budget?
Has the Navy published doctrine and tactics for Information Warfare?
Inasmuch as military operations are planned and executed in a joint context, is Navy Information Warfare responsible for Navy Information Operations as defined in Joint Doctrine (JP 3-13) and Navy Doctrine (NWP 3-13)?
In summary, is Navy information Warfare really warfare or just a misleading title for what is an aggregation of important legacy support specialties.