Station HYPO is proud to host the following article written by LCDR Nathaniel Rightsell, an active duty Cryptologic Warfare Officer.
With the establishment of the Information Warfare Commander at sea (IWC at sea) for post command Captains, the Navy has taken a large step forward to improve critically needed information warfare functions central to Fleet operations. Previously, these functions were handled by Deputy Information Warfare Commanders, primarily officers from the Cryptologic Warfare (CW) and Information Professional (IP) communities. The new Information Warfare Commander role offers each of the Information Warfare Community’s component communities (Oceanography, CW, IP, and Intel communities) the opportunity to integrate those functions in a more cohesive, competent manner, and with greater representation than ever before. Additionally, this move could enable Information Warfare to achieve parity with the other traditional warfare areas in operations. The increasing use of, and reliance upon, information and its effects make this a desirable outcome for everyone.
In addition to IWC at sea, the Navy will soon establish the Information Warfare Development Command (IWDC). Along with Navy Information Forces (NAVIFOR), IWDC will represent the shore based Information Warfare Community (IWC) efforts to the Fleet. Thus, there is an inherent and natural link between the IWC at sea position and the IWDC. If they are to be successful, both organizations must be able to reliably generate repeatable value in Fleet operations upon which the traditional warfare areas can rely. The ability of the other warfare areas to consistently trust IWC value and impact in operations is fundamental to proper alignment and use of information capabilities, particularly in Fleet operations.
While the Oceanography, CW, IP, and Intel communities are all part of the IWC, each remains separate, and for good reason. This does, however, raise challenges associated with ensuring consistent, viable product is provided to the Fleet via IWC at sea. Each community maintains different educational and experiential desires for its officers as they progress through the ranks. While this certainly makes sense for specific communities, the variances introduce discrepancies (from one officer to the next) in the IWC as a collective, and eventually into the IWC at sea position. A quick look at the community briefs and convening orders for each community within the IWC bears this out. How, then, does the IWC go about resolving the skill, educational, and experiential differences its communities mechanically create with a view to providing the Navy a dependable IWC at sea product? Surely the IWC cannot expect disparate backgrounds and experiences to generate a repeatable result with any degree of fidelity.
Perhaps the answer can be found looking outside the IWC for a moment. The unrestricted line communities (URL) communities produce differently skilled officers, yet all have a common operational background. Admittedly, this is easier for them. Their operations are, generally, at sea and platform based. Still, the example is relevant. Determining a common operational background for IWC officers (both within the IWC and in the Fleet) would generate common understanding over time. This is not to say the IWC simply should make every billet common, but rather that the IWC should come together in an operationally practical way and subordinate its communities in support of IWDC and IWC at sea. For the effort to be truly successful, the IWC must build to the IWDC and IWC at sea with all of its communities pulling in the same direction and for the same purpose (unity of mission). The junior officer operational tours and disassociated sea tours build the common purpose which enables the vastly different aviation and surface warfare communities to produce sufficiently reliable results for specific positions. Similarly, the IWC could benefit much more from cross detailing at a far lower level and in higher frequency than currently. Certainly, future IWC at sea officers stand to benefit more than the current approach.
Given the smaller presence of the IWC in Fleet operations, relative to the URL communities and to IWC efforts elsewhere, wholesale change should not be the goal. IWC should not trade away staples of what it does now in chase of what should be done. Yet, some change is obviously required. Part of this change should include ensuring an even address of Information Warfare and information related efforts across the Fleet. Correspondingly, NAVIFOR should consider providing the same basic IWC lines of operation and IWC staff composition to all deploying groups. As the electromagnetic and information environments impact all ships equally, the readiness level of every ship and group should probably also be equal. It is counterproductive to send one group on deployment with a LT and three other Sailors and the next group out with a CAPT and 7-11 other Sailors. The IWDC and IWC at sea effort must be balanced across all units, and while it isn’t entirely up to the IWC alone, certainly the IWC has a role. If the IWC does not “own” the billets on those staffs or the ability to obtain them (a debatable topic), it “owns” the content and should make such recommendations to SURFOR/AIRFOR. IWC should similarly feel empowered to provide recommendations on resources, mission set up, and other non-IWC operations which impact its own (general advocacy).
Another possible option to provide enhance dependability of IWC at sea functions is to realign communities. This topic briefly appeared in a couple blogs several months ago, but has never really been raised for serious consideration. It may be worth doing so now. The value in realigning certain functions between communities could potentially provide simplicity and clarity in the IWC approach to its broader effort. There is a significant amount of overlap between Intel and CW, for example, especially in Fleet operations and on staffs. Similarly, IP and CW have some overlap in the cyber realm. The argument is, as long as no single community is responsible for (and building toward) IWC at sea functions, those functions will be secondary in importance to the communities. Realigning functions of the communities within the IWC to tap one community which provides the IWC at sea position might be easier than constantly wrangling the four communities together to meet the need. Realignment could also offer the opportunity to relieve friction between community desires and officer desires, a friction which can be attributed to the large amounts of change over the past decade for the IWC. Similar to URL, the IWC at sea role is a generalist role likely best accommodated by someone interested in broader impact. IWC could shape a particular community or two in that fashion, while retaining its stable of technical depth outside the Fleet in its other communities. Or, could IWC create a separate designator beginning at LT which would culminate in IWC at sea? Lieutenants through Commander of all designators could apply and, if approved, work those jobs which best prepare her/him for eventual assignment as IWC at sea. Each IW community could easily identify which of their jobs holds significant value for future IWC at sea officers. Either of these two options demonstrates dedication to the Navy’s efforts to improve Information Warfare and also generates a specific IWDC/IWC at sea workforce. This approach is also more synonymous with the URL model and offers continual refinement of the product which doesn’t require multiple Flag officers, OPNAV, and four communities to arrive at consensus.
The IDWC and IWC at sea position are foundational changes for how the IWC will represent itself to, and operate within, the Fleet. No matter the good work outside Fleet concentration areas in METOC, CW, IP, or Intel commands, the IDWC and IWC at sea position are what the IWC has to offer the Fleet, at least in the eyes of the rest of the Navy. The Navy will base its trust in the IWC based on what NAVIFOR, IWDC, and IWC at sea deliver. Indeed, it is difficult to conceptualize a more valuable IWC tour from the Navy perspective than IWC at sea. Hopefully, the IWC senior leadership will all agree and it will become a discriminator for Flag officer selection. It is important for all the communities in the IWC to engage in shaping both the IWDC and the IWC at sea position. By being proactive and innovative, they are able to better support the Fleet, their own diverse goals, and those of their Sailors.
1 February 2017 at 14:57
Two challenges that will have to be overcome in order for the IWC Commander afloat to succeed beyond pretty slides and nice words:
(1) IWC Commander afloat owns bodies vice capabilities/platforms compared to their URL counterparts demanding that we immediately show impact and effectiveness
(2) The IWC doesn’t in any way own the operational tasking or organizational construct that governs the proposed position; that is SURFOR and the unit/group commander who get a vote, often the only vote that counts
Personally, while I don’t agree with the the desire to look like the URL, I understand its alure, but if done so too fully we will fail to demonstrate the unique capability(ies) that exist within the IWC or the individual designators that comprise the IWC. We should focus on being effective and delivering something (capabilities, personnel, platforms, etc) rather than looking like the URL.
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1 February 2017 at 16:35
Under the Composite Warfare Doctrine (NWP 3-56 and NWP 3-13), the Information Operations Warfare Commander is called the “IWC”. Won’t having yet another “IWC” result in confusion?
In accordance with NWP 3-56 and NWP 3-13, the Information Operations Warfare Commander (the other IWC) is assigned the following functions relating to the core functions of the Information Warfare Community (IWC):
— Assists OTC or CWC in force EW planning and integration.
— Coordinates and controls force ES assets and dissemination of ES information within the force.
— Coordinates and controls force EA assets.
— Coordinates employment of ES and cryptologic sensor equipment in support of force tactical intelligence requirements.
— Assists OTC or CWC in force computer network defense (CND) to include planning, integration, monitoring, and protecting information systems against both internal and external threats.
— Manages force use of the electromagnetic spectrum as force spectrum manager
— Integrates real time ES contact reports with indications and warnings to recommend force defensive measures and readiness conditions to OTC or CWC.
— Integrates indications and warning and special communications for BMD with the BMDC.
— Achieves and maintains information superiority….
— Establishes and maintains the tactical picture through spectrum awareness…..
Given the above, over what organizations or activities would the Information Warfare Commander at sea exercise command?
It would appear the Information Warfare Community (IWC) is in denial that the URL Information Operations Warfare Commander (IWC) exists; has established command functions over Information Warfare Community (IWC) systems and activities.
The Information Warfare Community studiously avoids the elephant in the room, Information Operations, and what Type Command and DCNO is responsible for manning, training, and equipping the fleet to perform the functions assigned to the Information Operations Warfare Commander.
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1 February 2017 at 18:50
We get it
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2 February 2017 at 00:33
FCC believes that this role could one day be a CSG Commander opportunity. But do we want that? That entails making huge changes to who we are; namely the URL switch.
At this level, the IWC should be integrating the 180x community and that’s not easy to do.
Bottom line is this: until a path is found to make the IWC a command at sea billet, we will ALWAYS be secondary considerations in planning. Sure, that IWC may have a shrimp fork but that command at sea pin holds a lot of weight in planning.
Sure, you may have a SWO pin; but it’s been 20 years since you were on an evolution. So they know we are rusty.
Make this a command at sea and things will start to change.
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2 February 2017 at 00:41
A pin or billet title won’t make us relevant. What we deliver to the fight will.
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2 February 2017 at 00:45
Agreed. But this has been debated for how long now? We changed names, we changed titles, and still the discourse continues. You can only get them to understand the value of what you if they see you as one them. Otherwise, we still be discussing when I retire in 10-15 years.
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2 February 2017 at 01:54
It is healthy to consider your own value. The true test is to gain input from others. I am not sure other warfare communities always consider us as secondary contributors. I say that with extensive experience operating outside of our own lifelines.
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2 February 2017 at 02:33
“FCC believes that this role could one day be a CSG Commander opportunity.”
Sorry — are you saying FCC thinks an IW officer can/will command a Strike Group? In what timeframe?
Also, when I read the list of tasks in Richard’s post I’m not sure we do a good enough job in preparing our DIWCs and now IWCs for executing them.
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2 February 2017 at 02:39
Richard – believe your point is the IWC is in denial it should be involved with all IO, as defined in doctrine. assume follow-on point would be denial has a price? Keep in mind it only costs those paying – that isn’t the IWC, yet. Pretty sure IOWC will be written out of Navy doctrine soon even if it doesn’t match joint doctrine and processes.
Don’t think FCC or any of the IWC wanted ‘IWC at sea’ except maybe IPs who are probably better choices for it anyway with broadest Fleet exposure. Convinced the idea was of Fleet origin. The communities would rather dwell in their own organizations and benevolently support the Fleet rather than having support onerously required of them. Much less pressure and lower risk; better foundries in which to forge success. They want to deliver at their own pace, in their own way, and not in response to some URL or operational requirement. Doesn’t matter now, though. It’s here and has to be done by the IWC for now. Curious how many are turning IWC at sea down with retirement papers. I know one.
“…extensive experience operating outside of our own lifelines.” Don’t our lifelines include surface and every other warfare area (?) and can our lifelines be described as unrestricted?
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2 February 2017 at 14:02
Policy can and will continue to change to meet fleet need, even that policy relevant to IO that Mr. Mosier demonstrates his ample ability to quote.
So what does the fleet need and what are we as an IWC capable of delivering are the two most relevant questions that will/should affect the policy.
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3 February 2017 at 03:41
IWC decides fleet need and doctrine for IWC contributions. this means IWC determines what is delivered. often what best builds IWC organizations is the largest factor. organizations are ego-centric, so their interests are not altruistic. lots of effort goes into making sure need doesn’t exceed capability and capacity, such as GAP message. but when fleet determines IWC need the largest factor is solvency and IWC organizations less so.
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