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| Its about the people – even the weird ones. |
Naval Cryptology provides decision makers with information about the adversary, while denying similar information to the adversary. Cryptologists have always conducted our business in the dark, windowless places of the world without complaint. We are quirky, in part because of the nature of our work, in part because of the types of people who are drawn to Cryptology. In the Navy today, with the exception of nuclear ratings, cryptologists are required to have the highest ASVAB scores. More often than not, we have strong computer backgrounds, or an interest in computers. We are smart and we are weird.
We are a diverse community. Traditionally, the officer ranks are filled with members from other warfare communities. Only recently has the Navy begun assessing officers directly from initial commissioning programs. In the enlisted communities, the reverse has been true. During the drawdown from Iraq and Perform to Serve, many enlisted ratings were forced to convert into the cryptologic community. The diversity and breadth of knowledge of the Navy is a strength of the cryptologic community. The reason is, to be an effective cryptologist, we have to think like the commanders we are advising. We also have to think like the adversary commanders we are up against. We have to be technically proficient, and yet culturally aware.
More so than any community in the Navy, it is the talent of the cryptologic community that is the real power of the community. As such the future of the cryptologic community lies in matching and developing talent to the task at hand.
There are several efforts underway to reimagine the way we do talent management both in the Navy , and within DoD. DoD Civilians should look out as well… changes are on the way.
What do you think of when you think of Talent Management in the cryptologic community?
How might we better use the diverse skillsets inherent in the cryptologic community?
Station HYPO 
15 October 2015 at 12:57
“The diversity and breadth of knowledge of the Navy is a strength of the cryptologic community.The reason is, to be an effective cryptologist, we have to think like the commanders we are advising. We also have to think like the adversary commanders we are up against. We have to be technically proficient, and yet culturally aware.”
This is a great point, but not sure it remains as true today as it was yesterday. The diversity and breadth of knowledge of the Navy have not been maintained through the consolidation of missions and shuttering of field stations. Additionally, the continued enlargement of national sites using billets from the Fleet contributes to a decline in Navy knowledge possessed by the cryptologic community. The cryptologic community has sequestered itself from the Navy, believing the world has changed so much through cyber it will be able to provide whate'er is needed as it sees fit. The sponsored educational opportunities for cryptologic officers and enlisted are not diverse and broad, they are specific and narrow, promising to generate a community of homogenous personnel who will wield “common knowledge” as the community's operating system. The result is institutional group think, and ultimately hubris-filled decisions.
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15 October 2015 at 14:15
How might we change that?
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15 October 2015 at 17:13
Ha!
Right on. There is a reason they are referred to as “Bugger-pickers”. Personally, I have never met a more special crowed in my life 🙂
Kind Regards,
Anneli Kershaw
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15 October 2015 at 17:39
Swinging big and crazy…
1) Divest cryptologic community management from the operational command in which it currently resides to an administrative command which is forced to feed the entire Navy (perhaps NAVIDFOR). This affords much better clarity and parity of priorities for the cryptologic community as a whole. This would be in line with the other communities.
2) Remove ALL cryptologic ADCON functions from C10F. Many ADCON functions remain as they have been mistakenly called OPCON functions (control of DIRSUP is an example – DIRSUP is not a C10F mission, but support to a different Numbered Fleet Commander's mission).
——
For the organization with ADCON functions:
3) Review and re-prioritize the support the cryptologic community provides to (all) Numbered Fleets based on discussions with the Numbered Fleet Commanders (to include C10F as a supported customer).
4) Re-examine use of P2/P3 billets at national sites, ZBR, and correct the books on the Navy side.
5) Break out the 'Big Four' into two separate commands at each location, reflecting the P2/P3 split. Thus, the big four O-6 commands would now be 8 O-5 Commands. (potential to administratively keep the O-6 over both)
6) Operationally align the O-5 Commands (the Navy ones-P2) at the Big Four to the Navy Numbered Fleet requirements. This includes a real FIOC mission (directed by Numbered Fleet and afloat cryptologic personnel), real time products supporting/advising Numbered Fleet and deployed CSG CCIRs/PIRs, redundant 24/7 India and Quebec function at those FIOCs, theater CRC positions in those FIOCs, and a theater CASE at each FIOC.
In this way, the cryptologic community would be able to better understand the Commanders we are (or should be) advising (via direct operational lines to the Numbered Fleets). The community would be more immediately responsive through this type of a decentralized, tailored approach in providing cryptologic goodness. This would also establish a level of redundancy and continuity (couldn't resist!) for each Fleet where XI (and perhaps some XQ) matters are concerned. It could also provide CASE capability remotely (not currently a requirement) for all afloat staffs from one location.
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15 October 2015 at 18:57
Swinging big but NOT crazy. There is a lot of goodness in what you have posted here. Now, how to execute?
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15 October 2015 at 22:58
There is goodness here… do we have a reader that is able to take this cause up?
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16 October 2015 at 00:24
Number 5 is long overdue… But I would take it a step further. Break each of the four major NIOCs into AT LEAST three O5 commands (an argument could be made for four) — each aligned along what I see as natural divisions of effort within each major NIOC. For example: 1) a cyber-focused command; 2) a fleet direct support/fleet reach-back command (comprised of all DSE and FIOC personnel, missions, and functions); 3) an NSA force provider command comprised of all P3 billets. A fourth option could be to split the direct support and FIOC missions into two separate commands (though I personally believe they are complimentary missions/functions that do well to be closely aligned with ease of leveraging each other).
Establish the three/four Commands as ADCON to our Type Commander (NAVIDFOR) and as CTGs OPCON to the current regional C10F CTFs. Make the current O6s TF Commanders with strictly an operational responsibility / focus. The subordinate O5s will then be dual-hatted as Task Group Commanders for accomplishment of mission and Commanding Officers responsible for all administration and care and feeding of its Sailors. (Another option would be to also dual-hat the O6s as both CTFs and a Commodore-like role with ADCON/ISIC responsibility over the O5 commands.)
There will be challenges, and it won’t happen overnight, but I am confident it would solve more problems than it would create. I know there are a lot of holes in such a proposal – and it needs to be thought through more and discussed more – but it’s a conversation worth having. I don’t know that it is the only right answer, but I am confident that we can better excel at the mission and better care for our Sailors under a different construct than that which exists.
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16 October 2015 at 03:20
If O5 Commanders are going to be CTG or CTU Commanders, the mission is best served with them being aligned appropriately. For the cyber commands C10F alignment is a natural. However, the O5 in charge of the Fleet Support/FIOC/CASE/CRC should be a CTG aligned under a Numbered Fleet, not to C10F, because they should belong to that which they support. Thats how Navy does it. His or her CRCs should perhaps be CTU/E under CTG. Most importantly, this would instill direct direct accountability for what the cryptologic community provides to the Navy.
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16 October 2015 at 07:37
I have to post my response in two parts because I exceeded the character limit. Here's Part One…
This would be a much better conversation over a beer than a continual back and forth on a blog. You can see who I am – feel free to look me up in the global, reach out, and talk this through some more. At the end of the day, I’m interested in turning talk into action. I don’t want this to be a mere intellectual exercise – but it must start there.
A few thoughts…
1. O5 Commanding Officers (in the IDC) are this very day Task Group Commanders — in fact every O5 CO in the IDC is dual-hatted as a CTG.
2. U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (though they have cyber in their name) has operational control over much more than cyber. In fact, she is “the central operational authority for networks, cryptologic/signals intelligence, information operations, cyber, electronic warfare, and space capabilities in support of forces afloat and ashore.” U.S. TENTH Fleet's mission is to execute all of those assigned missions to include cryptology and signals intelligence – in SUPPORT of and RESPONSIVE to Fleet/Numbered Fleet Commanders. Based on those mission statements, any of the cryptologic missions/functions, which we have discussed above, fall just as naturally under FCC/C10F as does cyber. You may disagree with this structure, but we’ve done alright with a similar structure for ¾ of a century.
3. What is a “cryptologic ADCON function”?
4. Re: “DIRSUP is not a C10F mission.” DIRSUP is not a mission. Finding and fixing a target is a mission. Reconnoitering a coastline is a mission. Searching for a submarine is a mission. DIRSUP is a means by which we provide a capability to accomplish/support those missions. C10F owns those capabilities – and should. They are a unique, functional (vice regional) numbered fleet that owns capabilities/skill sets vice platforms (with the exception of networks as platforms – but that’s a different discussion).
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16 October 2015 at 07:37
And Part Two…
5. Define “aligned”. Do you mean “assigned”? Our regional NIOCs/FIOCs are “aligned” with the Numbered Fleets that they support – that is the whole concept of having a Fleet Information Operations Center at our Big Four. I’ve been doing Direct Support for nearly 20 years and I’d say we have always been pretty responsive to the fleet’s needs. Are my experiences representative of everyone else’s? I certainly doubt it. Is there room for improvement? Always.
6. Re: “they should belong to the forces that they support. That's how the Navy does it.” Since when? What about supported / supporting relationships. What about direct support? The very concept is founded on the fact that certain support comes from those who do not belong to the supported forces. Augmentees are used throughout the Navy to fill a validated need/requirement that cannot be met organically – in my very recent experience, those cryptologic augmentees have been exceptional — not just one or two — nearly all of them for the past two years I’ve been in my current job.
7. How does your idea fit with current Fleet / Numbered Fleet structures? Specifically, where in the hierarchy (if you will) of already established Fleet CRCs, Numbered Fleet CRCs, and Strike Group CRCs would this additional Theater/(FIOC) CRC fall? Wouldn’t it be redundant to the role of our Numbered Fleet CRCs (responsible for cryptologic resource coordination for a specific theater/AOR)?
8. I would agree (you didn’t say, but I have inferred it from your comments) that the lines are unnecessarily blurred between what is ADCON and what is OPCON and who truly owns (is responsible for) what – NAVIDFOR or FCC/C10F. That’s not a statement about our understanding of ADCON or OPCON – it’s a statement about our Operational Commander retaining certain ADCON functions that are more traditionally, and arguably, more appropriately the role of a Type Commander.
*My intent here is to challenge thoughts and ideas and I hope to be challenged in return. Some of the above are firm convictions by me and others are just playing devil’s advocate (I won’t reveal which is which right now). You’ve given me cause to pause and look at some of these issues/ideas from a different perspective. That’s good.
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19 October 2015 at 17:07
1. True – O5 COs are CTGs. But, if the big four commands are broken out, the Fleet O5 COs should be part of the Numbered Fleet Commander’s (NFC) CTF structure whose mission they work (as opposed to being 1010, 1020, 1030, etc). C10F CTG/U/Es (1010, 1020, 1030, etc) should belong to the other (national) O5 command at each of the big four. It establishes accountability to the NFC.
2. Disagree this is how cryptology operated for over 70 years. Not about being “operational”–it’s about mission. The “centralized authority” approach is damaging to support and responsiveness, as the real supported commander (NFC) doesn’t have sufficient control or SA. METs for the Big Four tell show the level of support to the Fleets. Simply wanted to propose aligning CTG/U/Es with whose mission is actually being worked.
3. Q: What is a “cryptologic ADCON function”? A: Anything related to MT&E of cryptologic missions. All facets of direct support, Force level cryptologic personnel distribution, cyber training requirements, all facets of CCOP, etc.
4. Agree on DIRSUP not being a mission, but not on capability ownership. Equipping is not for an operational command, but an administrative command (MT&E). Equipping is handled at TYCOMS (for the rest of the Navy). Why should FCC/C10F own (those) capabilities when NAVIDFOR is chartered as the appropriate functional TYCOM?
5. Q: Define “aligned”. A: Items #1 and 2 refer. Fleet-focused O5 commands should bear the same CTF/G/U/E numbers (on a permanent basis) as the NFC (and subordinates) whose mission they work daily, vice C10F. They should be an inherent part of, and directly answer to, those CTFs in theater. FIOCs focus on NFC areas, but the NFC has no OPCON, TACON of the FIOC/shore CRC to direct proper support of his/her mission. Opinions on DIRSUP and FIOC quality will vary. It can and will get better, whether the community fixes it or someone fixes it on the community’s behalf.
6. CTF structure is used to identify operating units and organizational belonging. Why shouldn’t the new O5 command in GA be identified as a 5th fleet unit? Why wrestle with supported/supporting relationships when you have everyone on the same NFC team? Are the FIOCs part of the NFC team?? If so, they should be structured that way. If not, perhaps that should happen. And yes, community augmentees are exceptional.
7. Hierarchy depends on the Fleet and O5 Fleet command ashore. Generally, I see NFC CRC directing the work overall (just as he/she does with the CSG/CPR CRCs), and the CRC on the back end organizing, generating, and pushing it forward. Standing up and running a quality CASE which covers all deployed staffs and the NFC CRC in a given theater is a full time job for dozens of people. With respect to redundancy, it is one of the goals. We don’t have backup NFC CRCs. We use deployed staffs, when available, for XI/XQ functions as it is right now.
8. Agree on blurry ADOPTACON – it HAS to change.
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19 October 2015 at 17:28
Appreciate the discourse. Will reach out in a couple weeks. While presently intellectual gymnastics, it has to start with ideas. Am supremely confident in the future of both cryptology and cyber, as they outlast personalities and organizations. But, also believe RELEVANT Navy cryptology must better understand, orient itself toward, and operate as part of all the Navy's Fleets (not just one). Can't change the Fleet if you aren't in it. Presence matters.
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20 October 2015 at 23:53
Great responses — I infer that you are speaking from a different perspective and likely one closer to the issue than I am in my current position. Look forward to hearing from you and continuing the discussion — and hopefully bringing some other perspectives in as well.
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